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Abstract 
_____________________________ 	  
My research centers around the representation of traumatic or otherwise extreme human 
experiences through modes of fictional writing. I am essentially looking into the 
renderings of unspeakable subject matter that occupies a liminal space in language’s 
functioning. I aim to explore the potentialities of the most irredeemably strange or 
seemingly incoherent experiences of others, and show that they can be accessed and 
expressed. Accessing these types of memories or experiences by narrative and the 
techniques of fictional literature, brings us to a deeper understanding of and engagement 
with an experience when it is not our own.  I believe that looking into the formal 
techniques of literature can function to provide a point of entry into addressing the 
integrity and expressibility of experiences and memory’s functioning.  In my initial 
section, I aim to give a general sense of the functional definitions and critical influences 
of the themes of narrative, witness, trauma, and testimony.  The difficulties and 
paradoxes of coherent traumatic witnessing and testimonies are addressed through Laub, 
Felman, and Agamben—and I suggest that there is a need for something outside the 
realm of strict nonfiction and memoir in order to keep stories of extreme human 
experience alive in a cultural consciousness. Ultimately, I posit that the work of 
imaginative writing benefits and bypasses some of the discrepancies of testimony by 
means of some of the latitudes allowed by the formal aspects of fiction.   
 
The texts whose formal elements are addressed are W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz and Anne 
Michaels’s Fugitive Pieces. Using Austerlitz, I attend to the themes of alienation through 
looking specifically at narrative style. Using Michel de Certeau’s theory of the everyday, 
I suggest that the contours of the familiar have a specific capacity for expressing 
profundity in such a way in that they serve as a place of remembering and forgetting. The 
world to which most people can relate can be the location of an engagement with an 
experience that was perhaps beforehand beyond the realm of recognizable language. 
Through Michaels’s text, I explore the value of acknowledging a suspicion of language 
for its shortcomings for capturing the essence of descriptions. Following this, I also make 
a case for the value of empathic readings, as they serve the purpose of redemption and of 
fostering hope and healing in the wake of traumatic memory. 
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CHAPTER ONE 	  
Storytelling, Narrative, and the Impossibility of Silence: Disengaging Knowing from 
Telling 
_____________________________ 
 
As a child, I used to sneak into my mother’s makeshift office and leaf through the 
papers on our rarely used formal dining room table.  She is a lighting designer, and her 
work is always on special graph paper in numerous pencil shades.  I would perch myself 
precariously and carefully look through each oversized sheet with a mix of confusion and 
amazement.  The markings and figures meant nothing to me, and it seemed strange and 
wonderful to realize that she was paid to construct—as far as I was concerned—
nonsense.  I also found myself frustrated and fascinated that someone I cherished so 
dearly did these mental processes every day—and that I could not even begin to 
comprehend these thoughts.  This fascination is, of course, part of any normal cognitive 
developmental process—but this enthrallment and captivation is by no means outgrown 
after childhood.  The curiosity about the interiority of others’ minds and experiences is a 
fundamental human impulse. We constantly seek to understand the world by looking to 
the people around us. Understanding others’ experiences may help to give us access to 
not only a better understanding of ourselves, but also more fundamentally, what it means 
to be human, as it were.  The appeal of stories owes itself somewhat to this voyeuristic 
curiosity.  I posit that the understanding of the experiences of others is irrevocably tied to 
the capabilities of language and representation.  The representation of the quotidian 
generally does not fall outside the realm of language, and can thus be construed 
effectively in an understandable, lucid manner.  However, it is the liminal space outside 
the authority of language that “unspeakable” experiences or pain seem to occupy that will 
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be the subject of the forthcoming chapters.  These extreme human experiences 
problematically defy efforts at representation, and also paradoxically call for telling and 
testimony on their behalf.  In other words, these stories demand to be told, but come up 
against limits when being coaxed into expression and efforts at testimony.  As such, the 
testimonies that bear witness to extreme human experiences can appear incomplete, 
incoherent, or otherwise irredeemably strange.  What is of ethical concern is whether the 
method of representing the experience or trauma stands in the way of it being understood 
and addressed properly.  Testimonial literature surrounding the Shoah is a particular 
example of such admittedly problematic and paradoxical representations of extreme 
human experience that lingers in the cultural consciousness. The body of testimonial 
literature surrounding the Shoah is immense, and the concern over the limits of 
representation in the stories of survivors is of ethical interest when it comes to our 
notions of how well we understand, and can engage with experiences and memories of an 
immense intensity. 
The ethical issue of rendering an “unspeakable” experience accessible via 
language may take many forms.  Theodor Adorno’s well-worn axiom that “to write 
poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric”1 seems to effectively reject the notion that any 
aestheticization of the Shoah is of use as a means for representation and subsequent 
consolation.  However, in Negative Dialectics, Adorno writes, “it is now virtually in art 
alone that suffering can still find its own voice, consolation, without immediately being 
betrayed by it.”2  Adorno’s demand for ethical expression leaves him at an impasse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Adorno, Theodor. Prisms: Cultural Criticism and Society. Trans. Samuel and Sherry 
2 Adorno, Theodor W. Negative Dialectics. Trans, E.B. Ashton. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1973. 312. 
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between imagination and responsibility to the unimaginable historical event of the Shoah 
—an impasse that inquires into the functioning and power of imaginative writing. 
Ultimately, my interest in the subject of traumatic realism stems from an initial 
discomfort with such fictional accounts of Shoah survivors and victims.  In these works 
of fiction, the postmodern concern with the troubled representation of the “other” is 
compounded with the task of representing “unspeakable,” or traumatic experiences.  
Further, it appeared somehow dubious to use fiction as a vehicle to frame the ways in 
which language encounters limitations in the attempt to ethically construe extreme human 
experiences.  This problem of trying to represent an impossible and unspeakable event 
with a marked degree of verisimilitude is problematic for me primarily in that it is 
difficult to avoid a betrayal of both a historical sense of fact and those in a position of 
victimhood—especially in the instance of collective suffering.  To some extent, the 
authority of affect conjured in imaginative writing produces a huge emotional response, 
while not assuring the reader of factual accuracy—an effect that might be seen as 
exploitative.   
At the same time, my attention turned to the question of whether these fictional 
and imaginative expressions of loss and trauma serve any redemptive purpose in the 
wake of the Shoah.  Trauma theorists are chiefly concerned with the slippery nature of 
traumatic experiences, in that they somehow elude representation, while simultaneously 
demanding to be told.  As I have mentioned, the very structure of testimony, which I will 
define broadly as literature that bears witness to an experience, also functions to draw 
attention to this discrepancy in which language itself comes up against limits when 
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attempting to address trauma. Giorgio Agamben explains this tension of language and 
understanding in relation to what he calls the “aporia of Auschwitz”: 
We can enumerate and describe each of these events, but they remain 
singularly opaque when we truly seek to understand them…the 
discrepancy in question concerns the very structure of testimony.  On the 
one hand, what happened in the camps appears to the survivors as the only 
true thing and, as such, absolutely unforgettable; on the other hand, this 
truth is to the same degree unimaginable, that is, irreducible to the real 
elements that constitute it.3   
If language and memory cannot support the burden of traumatic experience, how is the 
experience of the victim to be expressed? Just because these events seem empirically 
impossible surely does not mean that they cannot be imagined. Testimony attempts to 
navigate this impossible task of representation, despite being composed of potentially 
burdensome fragmentation and memory.  Testimony’s attempt at narrative is at times 
overwhelmed by events that simply defy being anchored into recognizable knowledge, 
coherence, and understanding.  As such, can testimony be saved through imaginative 
means? Paradoxically, can imagination be the point of access into what which is 
“unimaginable”? Can the work of imaginative writing benefit and bypass some of these 
discrepancies by potentially providing an entry for engagement into an experience? First, 
it is important to note what constitutes “good” imaginative writing—especially when 
faced with the task of faithful representation.  I don’t believe the success of imaginative 
writing necessarily rests on the basis of how well it can persuade its reader—rather, it is 
its ability to engage said reader.  Malcolm Gladwell articulates this formulation with 
regard to literature, saying that it “succeeds or fails on the strength of its ability to engage 
you, to make you think, to give you a glimpse into someone else’s head—even if in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Agamben, Giorgio. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen. London: Zone Books, 2002. 12. Emphasis mine. 
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end you conclude that someone else’s head is not a place you’d really like to be.”4 
Engaging the reader adds, as I will argue, a complication to the division between 
historical “truth” and fiction, in that literature enables an engagement whose ethos may 
be more faithful to the traumatic event. Extending testimony into other forms allows for 
greater latitude in expression that can more easily settle into coherent and understandable 
narratives.  It is the intersection of imaginative renderings and responsibility to ethics and 
historical truths that draws my attention to this “storytelling” mode of fictional testimony.   
Giorgio Agamben and Theodor Adorno constitute some of the most important 
voices in the study of the empirical structures of testimony. Agamben’s characterization 
of witnessing is especially of interest in that he delineates some of the shortcomings of 
testimony, but also alludes to the problems of aestheticizing a narrative of trauma.  
Agamben laments the seeming impossibility of bearing witness as “unimaginable,”5 but 
does not rule out the possibility of representation of collective trauma altogether.  He 
writes that even a witness cognizant of the seeming impossibility of telling, “must bear 
witness in the name of the impos ibility of bearing witness,” and as such, “this alters the 
value of testimony in a definitive way; it makes it necessary to look for its meaning in an 
unexpected area.”6  In this way, Agamben points to the imaginative potential for faithful 
representation born out of the impossibility of testimony.  Agamben seems to look to the 
silences left by the linguistic lacuna of expressing traumatic experiences as a point of 
significance—but I assert that it points to an opportunity for a different mode of 
expression. The act of witnessing in extreme human experiences also serves as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Gladwell, Malcolm. What the Dog Saw. New York: Penguin, 2009. xv. 
5 Agamben, Giorgio. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen. London: Zone Books, 2002. 28. 
6 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 34. 
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impediment to an understandable representation.  Dori Laub’s reflections on witnessing 
and the historical experience of the Shoah serve to show us the complexities and inherent 
limits in attempting to construe the memories of extreme experiences.  Laub explains that 
there are three discrete levels of witnessing: being a witness to the experience itself, 
being witness to the testimony of others, and being a witness to the process of witnessing.  
He laments the frustration of the survivors’ need to tell their respective stories, and the 
inability to do so.  This frustration must be overcome in that the “‘not telling’ of the story 
serves as a perpetuation of its tyranny.”7  Laub describes the dangers of memory in an 
unarticulated testimony in that “the events become more and more distorted in their silent 
retention and pervasively invade and contaminate the survivor’s daily life.”8  He says 
that, “there is, in each survivor, an imperative need to tell and thus to come to know one’s 
story, unimpeded by ghosts from the past against which one has to protect oneself.”9  
This need to tell, however, is hindered by the regimes of empirical fact embedded in 
language and testimony. Laub states that,  
no amount of telling seems ever to do justice to this inner compulsion.  
There are never enough words or the right words, there is never enough 
time or the right time, and never enough listening or the right listening to 
articulate the story that cannot be fully captured in thought, memory, and 
speech.10 
 
This difficulty to articulate the traumatic experience through strict empirically-
based testimony calls for the possibility of other means in order to communicate 
the experience.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Felman, Shoshana and Dori Laub. Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis, and History. New York: Routledge, 1992. 79. 
8 Felman, Shoshana and Dori Laub. Testimony, 79. 
9 Felman, Shoshana and Dori Laub. Testimony, 78. 
10 Felman, Shoshana and Dori Laub. Testimony, 78. 
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The parameters of the term “narrative” focus upon endowing difficult to 
understand testimony with meaning, but this functional definition needs unpacking.  
Hayden White points to narrative as a “metacode, a human universal on the basis of 
which transcultural messages about the same nature of a shared reality can be 
transmitted.”11 White uses narrative as a method for translating of experience, and 
subsequent endowing of translated experience with meaning—whether applicable to 
barriers such as culture, or perhaps epoch.  Narrative becomes a way of turning “knowing 
into telling…fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of 
meaning that are generally human.”12 Roland Barthes furthers this equation of meaning 
and narrative, indicating that narrative “ceaselessly substitutes meaning for the 
straightforward copy of the events recounted.”13    
Another aspect that must be taken into account in exploring the fictional mode as 
a valid medium for rendering the experience of trauma is the politics of representation.  
Theorists Hayden White and Elaine Kauvar are of particular interest to me and 
effectively serve as interlocutors for many of my concerns about fictional representations.  
Kauvar asserts that too much abstraction can pry one away from accurate representation, 
but still believes in the importance and possibility of engagement with the experience of 
trauma.  White finds narrative problematic “only when we wish to give real events the 
form of a story.  It is because real events do not offer themselves as stories that their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 White, Hayden. “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,” Critical 
Inquiry 7(1980): 5-27. 6. 
12 White, “The Value of Narrativity,” 5. 
13 Barthes, Roland. “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives,” Music, Image, 
Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York, 1977), 79. 
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narrativization is so difficult.”14  Although I believe that White dislodges some of the 
power of historiography with his concern, some mediation on the part of narrative may be 
permissible for the sake of coherence and understanding.  My entrance into the discussion 
of these theorists consists of attempting to reconcile representational and aesthetic 
strategies of narrative and fiction with the fragmentary or inarticulate nature of traumatic 
testimony. 
In approaching fiction as a potential mode of expression for the impossible, I am 
drawn to Martha Nussbaum’s conception of the literary imagination and the judicious 
spectator. Beyond the silent impasse produced by the demand for real historical 
knowledge in testimony, fiction demonstrates its importance in its associated skill set. 
Nussbaum provides what I think is a rather utopian view of literature, particularly the 
techniques of fiction, but she provides another point of entry into the concept of 
testimony, and in this case, one based in political theory. She indicates that in a 
democratic society, one has to give ordinary people incentives to understand reason and 
to act upon the common good. The literary imagination functions to engender these 
incentives, as Nussbaum asserts, “I defend the literary imagination precisely because it 
seems to me an essential ingredient of an ethical stance that asks us to concern ourselves 
with the good of other people whose lives are distant from our own.”15  This plays into 
the fictionalization of testimony in that the implementation of the “literary imagination” 
allows for a careful and full engagement with the subjectivities of another’s experience—
particularly if these experiences are difficult to render or would not otherwise be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 White, “The Value of Narrativity,” 8. 15	  Nussbaum, Martha. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life. Boston:  
Beacon Press, 1995. xvi. 
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encountered by the reader. She uses the construction of the “judicious spectator,” a figure 
possessing the skill set of empathy, sentiment, and identification that is made possible 
through exposure to literary methods, particularly a third-person omniscient narration 
style.  It is through becoming a judicious spectator that one becomes a more engaged and 
informed participant in a democratic society—but also potentially more capable of 
understanding the experience of the other. Nussbaum’s figure suggests that fiction allows 
for greater freedom in representation of the witness/other, and these liberties may make 
for a more coherent rendering while still resonating with a larger sense of the “real” of 
historical knowledge found in testimony.  Fiction serves as an outlet to understand the 
witness/other in that the abilities of the judicious spectator cultivate and prime a deeper 
engagement with the text.  Nussbaum states that, “as we read we are immersed and 
intensely concerned participants”16 through this engagement. Further, what Nussbaum is 
suggesting is that the power built into the imaginative narrative form also coincides with 
the trope of witnessing present in nonfictional Shoah memoirs. The formal structures 
present in the experience of reading fiction are crucial to engaging deeply with the 
experience of others through witnessing.  Nussbaum states that this kind of engagement is 
necessary as,  
any further inquiry—including a critical inquiry about the literary work 
itself.  If we do not begin with “fancy” and wonder about the human 
shapes before us, with sympathy for their suffering and joy at their well-
being, if we do not appreciate the importance of viewing each person as 
separate with a single life to live, then our critique of pernicious emotions 
will have little basis.17 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 75.  
17 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 76. 
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In order to consider and understand the stories of others, there must be a sense of 
engagement, and an avoidance of generalized platitudes. Nussbaum argues that the goal 
of testimony lends itself well to the experience of imaginative fiction readership, and that 
the task of witnessing may be similar to the imaginative work necessary for an 
engagement with a narrative.  Ultimately, involvement of the witness with testimony is of 
great import.  As such, engagement with narratives comes to the fore as a tool for this 
deeper participation with the otherwise unfathomable experiences of others. 
 What makes literature and poetic language suited to an engagement with trauma is 
located in the fundamental structuring the experience of trauma. Trauma, Cathy Caruth 
states in her formulation of crisis is “experienced by the individual as an unexpected 
event that cannot necessarily be assimilated into consciousness and it therefore returns 
later to haunt the survivor through nightmares and repetitive actions.”18 As such, “the 
reality of the traumatic experience is not known or cannot be comprehended entirely in 
the first instance, because the full extent of its import is not located in a simple, violent 
and original moment of an individual’s past.”19 In this way, the truth of trauma cannot be 
linked entirely to a verifiable reality or what is known, and is experienced in a belated 
manner. Trauma is present in that which returns to haunt the victim. What returns to 
haunt the victim is not grasped in its entirety, and this makes the documentation and 
assessment of the experience rather difficult. What stories of trauma tell is not only “the 
reality of the violent event but also the reality of the way that its violence has not yet been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Williams, Merle and Stefan Polantinsky. “Writing at its Limits: Trauma Theory in 
Relation to Anne Michaels’s Fugitive Pieces,” English Studies in Africa 52.1: 1-14. 1. 
19 Williams, “Writing at its Limits,” 1. 
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fully known.”20 Trauma narratives, in this way, should not be approached in a simplistic, 
linear manner, as Caruth suggests that the tensions involved in the telling of these stories 
are best “spoken in a language that is always somehow literary: a language that defies, 
even as it claims, our understanding.”21 Both poetic, literary language and being witness 
to trauma occupy a space between knowing and not being able to empirically describe an 
experience. Unlike testimony, literature does not generally consist of a recitation of fact, 
but it does urge the reader to “encounter strangeness,” and imaginatively engage with the 
potentialities of “attested historicity of [history’s] unimaginability.”22 Poetic language, as 
opposed to historical testimony, provides more hospitable grounds for coaxing expression 
out of the silences and aporias of crisis, and registers the ethos of the tension and 
incomprehensibility of such experiences. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the texts used will serve as a point of entry 
into the work of imaginative writing centering around the experiences surrounding World 
War II.  These two novels function as fictive testimony in an attempt to bring to 
coherence the narratives of their respective historical moments.  W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz 
blends historical regimes of fact and imaginative rendering in the story of Jacques 
Austerlitz, and addresses the historical after-effects that link greater Europe’s wartime 
experiences under the Nazis with those in the present.  Sebald’s text demonstrates 
questions of particular horrors and trauma juxtaposed with the quotidian and minutia of 
everyday life.  The text allows for a nuanced exploration of memory and the texture of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Caruth, Cathy. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 6. 
21 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 5. 
22 Felman, Shoshana and Dori Laub. Testimony, 7, 105. 
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the everyday as present in trauma narratives.  Using background in everyday theory via 
Michel de Certeau, I posit that the contours of the familiar have a specific capacity for 
enabling an engagement in such a way in that they serve as a place of remembering and 
forgetting. The world to which most people can relate can be the location of an 
engagement with an experience that was perhaps beforehand beyond the realm of 
understandable language and recognizable knowledge. There is a danger in a merging of 
the particular and the everyday, especially when that particular is of an unspeakable 
nature.  On the other hand, this specificity of event may breed a remoteness of the crisis 
wherein it cannot be accessed.  Rostan argues that Sebald’s aesthetic “locate[s] historical 
trauma within the natural world and yet [does] so without ever naturalizing disaster,” and 
this “locating [of] trauma in the historical and natural world still offers the possibility of 
returning to more universal questions about the origins of the self and of injurious acts.”23  
The form and stylistic elements of Sebald’s text offers insight into the telling of an 
experience. More importantly, the form of Sebald’s text points to the value of storytelling 
and narrativity in representing reality.   
Anne Michaels’s novel Fugitive Pieces serves as a point of address for some of 
the potentially troublesome usage of aestheticization in testimony.  Her text addresses 
some of the same historical narratives as Sebald’s text, but employs a high lyricism and is 
entrenched in metaphor in both of its focalized voices: Jakob Beer, who witnessed the 
death of his family as a child at the hands of the Nazis; and Ben, a son of concentration 
camp survivors. Michaels’s lush language in presenting the story of Jakob, and to a lesser 
degree Ben brings to the fore the complexities of high lyricism and lavish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Rostan, Kimberly. “Reading Traumatically and Representing the Real in Collective 
Suffering,” College Literature, 33.2(Spring 2006): 172-183. 182. 
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metaphorization.  It seems somewhat irresponsible and jarring to present the unspeakable 
in such lyrical language and metaphorized history; but this resulting discomfort arguably 
adds to the experience and coherence of testimony.  Méira Cook takes issue primarily 
with Michaels’s text and characterizes it as “overwritten,” indicating that “when such 
metaphorically (over)lush language is used to express the romantic subplot, no contrast 
between form and content is possible and this failure results in a sentimental 
discourse.”24  However, despite its flaws, I find Michaels’s text successful as a 
meditation on remembrance and memory. It is through the lush poetics that empathic 
identification and unsettlement are engendered, and a redemptive re-experiencing of 
crisis complicates conceptions of history and time.   This exercise in storytelling actively 
demonstrates many of the dangers of aestheticization, but also works to redeem these by 
fostering an emotionally complex and compelling narrative. 
It is not my aim to rehash the discourse of the ethics of representation surrounding 
the Shoah or other collective instances of extreme human experience.  Although it may 
be necessary to revisit the ethical and political concerns surrounding such areas of 
address, as this is a scholarly paper, that area holds less inspiration for me than something 
more fundamentally, albeit humanistic in treatment.  I am far more interested in the mode 
of storytelling, imaginative writing, and the applications to subjects and experiences that 
occupy a liminal space in language’s functioning.  I am looking for a deeper engagement 
with unspeakable or unspoken subject matter, and the potential that even the most 
irredeemably strange or incoherent experiences of others can in some way be accessed 
and expressed.  Bruno Schulz writes that there are things, “that cannot ever occur with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24 Cook, Méira. “At the Membrane of Language and Silence: Metaphor and Memory in 
Fugitive Pieces,” Canadian Literature 164(2000): 12-33. 17. 
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any precision.  They are too big and too magnificent to be contained in mere facts.  They 
are merely trying to occur, they are checked whether the ground of reality can carry 
them,” further, “they quickly withdraw, fearing to lose their integrity in the frailty of 
realization.”25  I believe that it is precisely these kinds of memories or fleeting moments 
of lucidity that are difficult to grasp or communicate that are central to address in 
encountering the “real” in narrative. It is this “frailty of realization” that is of special 
interest to me, and its potential to be brought about by narrative and the techniques of 
literature that bring us to a deeper, finessed understanding of an experience when it is not 
our own.  I wish to address the specific ways in which imaginative writing is a complex 
but worthwhile venue to bear witness. The elements of aestheticization and formal 
techniques of literature function effectively as tools for providing an effective point of 
entry for liminal experiences. It is in the interest of exploring the implications of poetic 
language and their functioning on the page in the literature written in the wake of loss and 
trauma that has driven my research. I intend to demonstrate the value and need for poetics 
in constructing venues for engagement with the things that are most difficult to bear. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Schulz, Bruno. The Street of Crocodiles and Other Stories. New York: Penguin Books, 
1963. ix. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Memory and Creative Force: Sebald and (Re)Writing Trauma in the Everyday 
_____________________________ 
 
 
 W.G. Sebald’s place in post-World War II Europe is an inherently political one—
but some of his experiences as a German expatriate jar against the subject matter of his 
work. The themes and subjects of his texts carry overtly nationalistic tones that imply an 
understanding of and identification with the cultures of loss, shame, and resentment in 
that characterized the post-war period. By providing a short biographical section with 
particular attention to Sebald’s connections to post-war German thought, I believe I can 
better inform some of the aporias of memory that manifest themselves in his writing, and 
how memory as a creative gesture is grounded. Born in 1944 in the southern Bavarian 
town of Wertagh im Allgäu, Sebald grew up not in the midst of a war zone, but in a small 
village in the Alps near the Swiss border.  Although removed geographically from the 
greater wartime involvement of Germany at the time, Sebald’s father was directly 
involved in that he was an officer in the German Wehrmacht, and only returned home 
from a prisoner-of-war camp in 1947.26  The village Sebald grew up in escaped the 
physical damage of the war, but he was keenly aware of the implications and larger social 
damage of the war.  In describing his first visit to Munich with his parents in 1947, he 
described the damage from the Allied bombing of the city, later saying, “you might have 
a few buildings standing intact and between them an avalanche of scree.” However, this 
damage was never directly addressed or acknowledged by his parents, although he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Schwartz, Lynne Sharon, ed.  The Emergence of Memory: Conversations with W.G. 
Sebald. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2007. 10. 
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remarked that, “they could remember if they wanted to.”27  His father was a rather 
austere man whom Sebald resented for his participation in and subsequent silence about 
the war. Frustrations stemming from his dissatisfaction with his ex-Nazi professors and 
their refusal to address the recent past of the country at the universities drove Sebald to 
pursue his postgraduate education in England, at the University of Manchester. He 
remained at the University of East Anglia until his death in a car accident in 2001.	  	  I am 
particularly intrigued by Sebald’s assertion that a proper address of the past could have 
been made possible, “if they wanted to,” and how this sentiment echoes some of his 
frustrations and the thematics of his texts with regard to documenting and engaging with 
history. His frustrations with the suppression of remembering frame many questions as to 
how memory is imaginatively directed and manipulated. These frustrations also function 
to cast doubt upon more “objective” modes of documentation, such as photography—
which Sebald uses extensively in his later work. The trajectory of Sebald’s work displays 
some of the engagement with these questions and frustrations.  
His first major literary work, published in 1988, was Nach der Natur (After 
Nature). As it was written in Sebald’s native German, his popularity was by no means 
widespread, but the text attracted positive reviews in Germany nonetheless. After 
publishing his second text Schwindel (Vertigo), which gives a sense of post-war village 
life in Bavaria though his narrator, Sebald’s publication of Die Ausgewanderten (The 
Emigrants) in 1992 brought him widespread recognition and praise.  Sebald’s novel 
engages with the subjectivities of the victims of German wartime aggression in that the 
majority of the narrators of the text are forced to leave Germany because they are Jewish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Schartz, ed. The Emergence of Memory, 161-2. 
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and subsequently face persecution.	  	  This text introduces and addresses the themes of 
displacement, exile, and loss that lace the plots of Sebald’s later texts as well. The 
Emigrants was the first of Sebald’s novels to be translated into English in 1996, which 
opened the doors to establishing attention and critical acclaim outside of Germany.  In the 
UK as well as the United States, Sebald’s work was particularly well received and 
garnered more attention than he previously had in the German-speaking literary arena. 
Die Ringe des Saturn (The Rings of Saturn), published in German in 1995, and 
subsequently translated to English in 1998, takes the loose form of a travel narrative, and 
again touches upon themes of exile and displacement.  He works in metaphor through the 
Nazi cultivation and promotion of the silkworm during the Third Reich. This cultivation, 
as per the Nazi rhetoric, will teach “the essential measures which are taken by breeders to 
monitor productivity and selection, including extermination to prevent racial 
degeneration.”28  Sebald’s text is a rather thinly veiled exploration of the genocide at the 
hands of the Nazis, but again uses a narrator who can be identified as a victim of German 
aggression, and explores the feelings of displacement that occur in the post-war period.  
Luftkrieg und Literatur (On the Natural History of Destruction) is Sebald’s nonfiction 
work based on a series of lectures given in Zurich in 1997 that centered around the lack 
of German literary treatment of the Allied bombings of German cities in a series of rather 
polemical essays, and was translated into English posthumously in 2003. Sebald’s last 
major work of prose before his untimely death is a text that is widely regarded to be his 
most defining work.  Austerlitz was published in 2001, and follows the protagonist 
Jacques Austerlitz, who was evacuated from Prague as part of a kindertransport at the age 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Schartz, ed. The Emergence of Memory, 12. 
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of four along with other Jewish children, to escape persecution during the war.  A Welsh 
Calvinist couple raises him, and years later after a nervous breakdown, Austerlitz begins 
to explore the nature of his family and childhood, and searches around the villages and 
archives of Europe for some claim to his history and family, based upon the fragmentary 
memories and narratives he gathers of his past.  At first blush, the plot can perhaps be 
seen as somewhat derived, but what makes Austerlitz such a compelling text is the 
masterful way in which it is written.  It pushes definitions of genre, and the scope of its 
narrative embedding of exile, return, remembering, forgetting, loss, and grief draws 
attention to the strategies of representation and storytelling with regard to the treatment of 
collective knowledge and historical memory.  It is Sebald’s last text that will be the focus 
of this chapter, as I view it as the summa of Sebald’s body of work, and evocative of the 
kind of formal and thematic features of narrative that make representations of traumatic 
or otherwise extreme human experiences more accessible for engagement.  As such, 
some insights into Sebald’s experiences may illuminate the preoccupations with the 
themes of displacement and alienation present in Austerlitz. 
The themes of exile, wandering, and displacement that occupy Sebald’s texts may 
be influenced by his personal experience as a displaced person. But these themes may 
echo some of the themes of modernity of the twentieth century, as present in the position 
of the “outsider” or “other” that preoccupies so much of existential thought and literature, 
as well as post-war identity—or rather, disruption of identity. Although by no means a 
representative figure for the period, Sebald’s decision to leave his native Germany for 
England at an early age, as well as his polemical treatment of Germany’s view of its own 
history in his work has brought up questions about his ambivalence for his provincial 
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German origins.  Quoted in an interview with Tim Parks, Sebald contrasts the Jewish 
experience of emigration and displacement with his own self-expatriation, in that the 
“attempt to hide or obscure one’s origins, I think, is more definitely associated with the 
Jewish community than with odd German immigrants like myself.”29 However, one’s 
origins and the search for them remain an object of attention for the displaced.  Sebald 
continues that the “presence of the past has something very ambivalent about it.  On the 
one hand it is burdensome, heavy, it weighs you down, on the other hand it is something 
that liberates you from present constraints.”30  It is through this ambivalence that Sebald 
may find narrative grounding to explore the themes of the relationship of man to his 
environment in a historical sense, as well as the nature of memory—collective or 
individual, and how memory can be transmitted and imaginatively altered from one 
generation to another.  Sebald’s texts serve as a complex but evocative point of entry into 
how loss, forgetting, displacement, memory, and destruction can be narratively 
embedded. In turn, this point of entry allows for a vantage point of how these themes can 
be formally accessed. 
Testimony’s attempt at narrative is at times overwhelmed by events that simply 
defy being anchored i to recognizable knowledge, coherence, and understanding. I posit 
that the work of imaginative writing benefits and bypasses some of the discrepancies of 
testimony by means of the liberty allowed by the formal aspects of fiction.  Sebald’s texts 
access some of these potential latitudes of the area of fictional testimony, through formal 
elements such as the inclusion of photos in the text, sentence structuring, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Denham, Scott and Mark McCulloh, ed. W.G. Sebald: history, memory, trauma. Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2006. 23. 
30 Denham, Scott and Mark McCulloh, ed. W.G. Sebald, 23-4. 
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narrator’s focalization. Studying the formal techniques function as tools provides a point 
of entry into addressing the integrity and expressibility of experiences. What I wish to 
study in Sebald’s text are the aspects and applications of these techniques, particularly the 
rendering of memory. It is the intersection of imaginative renderings and responsibility to 
ethics and historical truths that draws my attention to the “storytelling” mode of fictional 
testimony, and the potential thereof.  Highlighting Sebald’s use of some of these 
techniques helps illuminate the implications and value of their overall functioning.   
The first formal element in Austerlitz I wish to address is the shifting narrative 
voice through which the story is told.  The narrator of the plot describes the life of 
Jacques Austerlitz, whom he first meets in the Antwerp railway station, and constantly 
struggles to make sense of his brutalized childhood of which he knows very little.  The 
unfolding narrative is that Austerlitz was born in Prague to a fairly affluent Jewish couple 
just before the rise of the Nazi party in Germany.  His father was active in liberal politics, 
and the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia forces him to flee to Paris, and was never to be 
heard of subsequently—his letter  to his family ostensibly intercepted and confiscated by 
Nazi authorities.  To escape Nazi-occupied Prague, Austerlitz’s mother manages to have 
her son sent to Londo  by means of a kindertransport, and he is then taken in by an 
emotionally-devoid Welsh couple.  After a lonely number of school years, Jacques is 
encouraged by his history teacher to go to Oxford, where he studies architecture.  Later, 
he obtains a teaching post and settles in London’s East End.  Bereft of friends, and after 
suffering a nervous breakdown due in part to his discovery of the nature of his childhood, 
Austerlitz decides to track down what happened to his parents and explore the nature of 
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his origins. Thus he searches through the archives, train stations, and otherwise informal 
records of Europe.   
The basis of the text is that the author and narrator meet periodically–in Antwerp, 
in a bar in London, and a café in Paris—and the narrator (Austerlitz) recounts the 
melancholy story of his life, such that the reader has essentially been taken on a guided 
tour of a searched for, but lost European civilization.  In this style through which 
Austerlitz searches for the story of what became of his father and mother, Sebald’s 
narrator highlights the ways in which archives and collections of records enshrine 
memories. The memories are there, but hidden—needing a degree of excavation in order 
for them to be reclaimed as recognizable knowledge.  Through Austerlitz’s recounting of 
his story to the narrator, and providing him with all the photographs with which he has 
slowly constructed the history, a narrative is constructed that “serves as a temporary 
reprieve from the erasure of history that people, objects, and events” undergo.31  The 
narrator becomes the means for storytelling of Austerlitz’s story, but more importantly, 
this narrative also is simultaneou ly the story of this narrator’s renderings of these stories 
and memories.  The artifice of the storyteller presenting Austerlitz’s account by proxy 
foregrounds the narratives created around and by the photographs. The intermingling of 
voices of the narrator telling Austerlitz’s story is the collective shaping of a history—the 
projection of meaning onto sites of memorial.  As the text itself is the series of encounters 
of the two storytellers, and of encounters with places and grief—from a fortress outside 
Antwerp to Prague, through Theresienstadt, the concentration camp where Austerlitz’s 
mother was killed at the hands of the Nazis, and the national archives in Paris.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Kochhar-Lindgren, Gray. “Charcoal: The Phantom Traces of W.G. Sebald’s Novel-
Memoirs,” Monatshefte, 94.3(Fall 2002): 368-380. 371. 
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Because of the varied nature of the voices constructing the overall narrative, the 
story becomes a ventriloquist act of sorts.  The overarching narrator is present throughout 
the voices of others telling the story, as a kind of director or conductor of the other 
voices, giving each voice a turn to tell, but simultaneously there—coordinating and 
arranging these voices of memory in order to construct an aggregate history.  This multi-
voiced story becomes an attempt at memory’s reclamation of history, and imposing 
meaning upon “lost” objects, places, and histories through memory itself.  Arthur 
Williams notes that Sebald’s choice of narrative style as the conductor or arranging voice 
of the narrative, “undermines the reliability of his informants’ memories in order to assert 
the power of the creative imagination.”32 At the same time, the narrator’s position is 
ultimately as an outsider, even when he is speaking for himself because of this 
multifarious nature of voices.  Displacement of voices, memories, and overall meaning is 
aggravated by his sense of being an outsider to himself as well as the aggregate 
narrative’s construction. He notes that he feels a sense that his surroundings in London 
are “alien and incomprehensible in spite of all the years that have passed since [his] 
arrival in England.”33 Personal memories and narratives are undermined by the artifice of 
construction itself, drawing attention to the forces that undermine memory.  This sense of 
displacement and alienation, I argue, functions in the overall form of narrative by 
drawing attention to the way in which language itself has the potential to displace 
meaning, and in which the rendering of memory becomes an intention-filled creative 
force for this sense of meaning. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Williams, Arthur, Stuart Parks, Julian Preece, ed. “Whose Story?”—Continuties in 
Contemporary German-language Literature. New York: Peter Lang, 1998. 111. 
33 Sebald, W.G. Austerlitz. London: Penguin Books, 2001. 36. 
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Helen Finch addresses Sebald’s complex relationship to history and memory, and 
positions his “’landscapes of memory’ as a space of redemption, beyond the horizon of 
history.”34 Finch is helpful with regard to memory in pointing out that “in metaphysical 
or theological terms…neither Austerlitz, the character, not his Sebaldian amanuensis are 
granted any redemption from history.”35 Instead, Sebald’s formulation of redemption 
involves both “a continuation of familial tradition in the face of historical separation and 
loss,” and “a redemptive poetics which makes of poetic language itself a utopian, 
ahistorical landscape, one where temporally separated generations can be reunited.”36 
Finch also looks to Sebald’s engagement with poetic language and the imaginative 
construction of memory transcending the constraints of mere historical fact. I wish to 
distinguish my argument from that of Finch in proffering an examination of how the 
poetics of imaginatively influenced memory functions on the page. Whereas Finch 
formulates the space as ahistorical in nature, I argue that the poetics are not grounded in 
the data of history, but the potentialities of memory swell around this foundation of 
empirically based events. Creatively forged memory functions for Finch as a redemptive 
space for Sebald, and I would now like to draw attention to the particular techniques 
through which Sebald engages with history in a way that informs imaginative narratives. 
Memory as a flexible creative force is complicated by Sebald’s constant use of 
printed diagrams, maps, and snapshots throughout the text.  These visual additions 
function to give grounding to elements of the story, as many times Austerlitz will be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Finch, Helen. “ ‘Die irdische Erfüllung’: Peter Handke’s Poetic Landscapes and W.G. 
Sebald’s Metaphysics of History.” in W.G. Sebald and the Writing of History, ed. Anne 
Fuchs and J.J. Long, 179-198. Würzburg: Verlag Königshausen & Neumann GmbH, 
2007. 179. 
35 Finch, “’Die irdische Erfüllung’,” 197. 
36 Finch, “’Die irdische Erfüllung’,” 182. 
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describing a picture to the narrator and its ostensible meaning, and it is shown on the 
opposite page.  It mimics a scrapbook of sorts, but also may suggest a kind of resorting to 
forms of anchoring experiences and memory into recognizable knowledge when one 
begins to lose one’s way of constructing meaning.  The narrator reflects upon this use of 
photos to help ground his telling of Austerlitz’s story, as he initially “had some idea since 
out first conversations in Antwerp of the extent of his interests,” but “the drift of his 
ideas, and the nature of his observations and comments, always made extempore or first 
recorded in provisional form, but eventually covering thousands of pages.”37  The only 
way in which the narrator can begin to render Austerlitz’s story is by grounding it in the 
visual elements, as a kind of grossly extended captions. The narrator begins, “to assemble 
and recast anything that still passes muster in order to re-create before my own eyes, as if 
in the pages of an album, the pictures of the landscape, now almost immersed in oblivion, 
through which my journey had taken me.”38  Sebald’s use of “re-create” suggests the act 
of recollection, but also the potential to alter the original image in its re-imagining.  In a 
remembering that does not come to coherence or otherwise conspires to confuse, memory 
shows itself to be a creative and generative force.  It invokes an act of re-creation through 
memory, the molding and shaping of an image that suggests a shuffling of parts in order 
to obtain a semblance of coherence or meaning.  This move, of course, involves 
acknowledging that memory has the power of establishing and changing meaning, and is 
very much applicable in the way in which images are used as a storehouse for memory. 
This usage of visuals as applying structure to language brings into question how Sebald 
represents and conceptualizes human memory. Do seemingly objective images provide a 	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38 Sebald, W.G. Austerlitz, 121. 
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kind of grounding or anchor for human memory, or shape the way in which we create and 
re-create memory?  The shutter falls like a guillotine on a moment, but brings something 
ostensibly objective into resonance with the realm of the personal and subjective.  
Kochhar-Lindgren argues that the use of images, “generates an ambiguous sense 
of veracity, a series of interruptions in the flow of the text,” as well as “raises the 
question of the relationships between image and text.”39 Is this “ambiguous sense of 
veracity” of images useful in order to combat the sheer elements of construction and 
abstraction of language in the rendering of history and memory, or to draw attention to it?  
Austerlitz reflects this frustration, indicating that even when a, 
train of thought did succeed in emerging with wonderful clarity inside my 
head, but I knew even as it formed that I was in no position to record it, 
for as soon as I so much as picked up my pencil the endless possibilities of 
language…became a conglomeration of the most inane phrases.40  
 
Austerlitz cites the nature of language itself as problematic in the negotiation of memory 
into a coherent narrative. There is the implication that the possibilities of language 
somehow pose a greater likelihood of clouding its own expression—removing clarity 
with various potentialities. The problem resides in the “endless possibilities” of language 
rather than any sort of constraint. Ignorance is a non-issue when faced with the bulky, 
awkward, yet elusive nature of attaching words to experience. Language, for Sebald’s 
narrator, holds the power of gesture, not description—and thus there is a reluctance to 
ascribe words to a memory or an event. Language becomes arbitrary in this construction. 
Words are completely impotent to assign or carry meaning, so the narrator looks to the 
potentiality of images.  He laments this frustration of words stating,  
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40 Sebald, W.G. Austerlitz, 122-3. 
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The entire structure of language, the syntactical arrangement of parts of 
speech, punctuation, conjunctions, and finally even the nouns denoting 
ordinary objects were all enveloped in impenetrable fog.  I could not even 
understand what I myself had written in the past—perhaps I could 
understand that least of all.  All I could think was that such a sentence only 
appears to mean something, but in truth is at best a makeshift expedient, a 
kind of unhealthy growth issuing from ignorance, something which we 
use, in the same way as many sea plants and animals use their tentacles, to 
grope blindly though the darkness enveloping us.  The very thing that may 
usually convey a sense of purposeful intelligence—the exposition of an 
idea by means of a certain stylistic facility—now seemed to me nothing 
but an entirely arbitrary or deluded enterprise.  I could see no connections 
anymore, the sentences resolved themselves into a series of separate 
words, the words into random sets of letters, the letters into disjointed 
signs…and the sight of it increasingly filled me with feelings of horror and 
shame.”41 
 
The entire structuring and functioning of language betrays the power to communicate any 
recognizable rendering of reality in memory effectively, and suggests that the use of 
images is one that looks outside itself for meaning.  With respect to narrative voice, 
photography forces an unambiguous naming of position in relation to the self.  Roland 
Barthes addresses this concern of position as a “history of looking,” indicating that the 
self “never coincides with [its] image; for it is the image which is heavy, motionless, 
stubborn” which results in a “cunning dissociation of consciousness from identity.”42 
This conceptualization informs the notion of an “objective” positioning of the photograph 
or snapshot.  The idea behind a snapshot is that it is assumed to in some way preserve a 
moment or image in an objective way, free from the biases of the observer. Barthes 
writes that, “what the photograph reproduces to infinity has occurred only once: the 
photograph mechanically repeats what could never be repeated existentially.”43  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Sebald, W.G. Austerlitz, 124, emphasis mine. 
42 Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. Trans Richard Howard. 
London: Flamingo/Harper Collins, 1984. 12. 
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photograph serves, in Barthes’s formulation, as an encounter with the “real,” to interact 
with an objective event that is represented the way it occurred.  Barthes refers to this 
necessarily real event or subject as photography’s referent, and contrasts them with the 
referent of other forms of representation, such as in painting or literature.  He explains, “I 
call the ‘photographic referent’ not the optionally real thing to which an image or a sign 
refers but the necessarily real thing which has been placed before the lens, without which 
there would be no photograph.” This assumption points to a claim of objectivity, that we 
“can never deny that the thing has been there…we must consider it, by reduction, as the 
very essence…of photography.”44  As such, to view a photograph is to encounter a 
moment that is inextricably tied to the realm of the “real.” In other modes of 
representation, namely literature, the subject can easily be fabricated. Photography carries 
an impression of authenticity in an objective sense.  This is important in Sebald’s 
constant use of photographs throughout his text, in that there is necessarily an invocation 
of what is to be considered “real.” Photographs within the text are presented in a way that 
inhabits the area between the imaginative space of writing and what is considered to be 
“real.”  That is, the use of photographs functions to anchor a sense of objectivity. 
Photographs function outside the varied potentialities of memory in that they are 
necessarily anchored into something that inherently occurred, as Barthes mentions.  They 
are a direct recreation and mirroring of a past event or scene, which stands in contrast to 
the malleable and numerous renditions of memory.  By drawing attention to the multiple 
modes of representation in narrative and image, the creative force of memory is extended 
into a space that it can be either reinforced or obscured when juxtaposed with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 76. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
30	  
photographs.  In this way, the use of photos and diagrams functions to bring a directive 
force to the admittedly derived nature of memory, to use “objective” elements in 
construing everything from a brutalized history to ordinary objects. 
 During the course of the telling of his story, Austerlitz makes reference repeatedly 
to ordinary objects and memories, in addition to traumatic ones, being laden with the 
complication of also being difficult to fall into language.  However, in his search to make 
sense of the traumatic memories of his childhood and of what became of his parents, 
Austerlitz only has the contours of the ordinary and quotidian as his point of access.  
Although he visits the concentration camp where his mother was killed, most of 
Austerlitz’s journey is spent in train stations, small villages, and otherwise less than 
explicitly obvious locations of trauma.  Perhaps it is with attention to the tangible, 
graspable items and elements of the everyday that words will have a more physical, 
demonstrable force.  It is these less than “exceptional” places that provide him with his 
information and memories about the past. Sebald’s use of photographs ties in suitably to 
addressing aspects of the “everyday,” as it engages with the larger landscape of art’s 
appropriate functioning and place in society.  John Roberts writes that “photography’s 
intimacy with the everyday connects the categories of art to the agency and 
consciousness of specific objects, in specific social contexts, faced with specific 
problems.”45 Photography engages with the specific, but generally unremarkable 
elements of society, which I will refer to as “the everyday.” It is in these specific, yet 
inconspicuous events and placed that there is great potential for the storing of memory. 
Through the use of a few contemporary theorists, namely Michel de Certeau, I aim to 	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  Roberts, John. The Art of Interruption: realism, photography and the everyday. 
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connect what is seen as the ordinary with its capacity for profundity as a venue for 
memory, both facilitating respective remembering and selective forgetting. 
Beginning of course with a functional delineation of terms, the term “everyday 
life” or “the everyday” is admittedly problematic and slippery, as it naturally raises the 
question of whose life and everyday is being invoked. The term “everyday” can be used 
in a way that normalizes a dominant or common culture (i.e. “people like us” or 
“ordinary people”) or in a way that highlights the “other,” or “voices from below,” 
outside of a dominant culture, whose worldview would ordinarily not be seen, for reason 
that it is outside that of an elite culture.  It is the seeking out of relics in attics to reflect 
reality rather than archives of government records, so to speak.  Ben Highmore asserts 
that the term “everyday life” is “not simply the name that is given to a reality readily 
available for scrutiny; it is also the name for aspects of life that lie hidden. To invoke an 
ordinary culture from below is to make the invisible visible.”46  These aspects of the 
everyday are of interest because they are at times obscured from sight by rationalism.  
Highmore writes that it is “precisely [the] rationalism that transforms the insignificant 
and everyday into ciphers for the bizarre,”47 and as I posit, the traumatic as well.  
Highmore removes the power from the “rational” in that it “seeks to disenchant the world 
through an unquestioned belief in its own value,” and functions as “the emergence of new 
myths and rituals under the banner of the ‘true.’”48  In this regard, the everyday stands as 
a place for the discovery of previously obscured experience and memory, rather than a 
place of boredom or unchanging routine. Theorists have tried to map out the strangeness 
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of the everyday and make it clear that there is far more dimension in the mundane that 
warrant attention.  That is to say, the exceptional is concealed in the everyday. Theorist 
Michel de Certeau sources the everyday for a certain essence of existence, and holds that 
the everyday is necessarily hidden and needs to be searched out.  In his formulation, the 
everyday isn’t fully mappable by language or images alone, but “textured by evocations 
that point to a sensory realm.”49  de Certeau’s take on the everyday is useful in his 
conception of the problematics of cataloguing and archiving the ordinary.  Quoted in 
Highmore, de Certeau argues that “the study of…everyday life ‘presupposes an 
unavowed operation’: ‘to conceal what it claims to show,’”50 much like the Foucauldian 
archive, in which knowledge is dependent upon and subject to the power that makes it 
recognizable.  However, the theory accounts for the everyday as that which is both 
present and not present in this knowledge, which he calls the “geography of the 
eliminated.” de Certeau explains this “geography of the eliminated” as being “beyond the 
question of method and contents, beyond what it says, the measure of a work is what it 
keeps silent…these blank spots outline a geography of the forgotten.”51  The contours of 
the familiar are positioned in such a way in that they both serve as a place of 
remembering and selective forgetting.   
When referring to what I call “forgotten” memory, I would like to point to the 
distinction of these memories functioning in the sense that they can be recovered, but are 
not pursued.  Anne Whitehead writes that this kind of “history of memory is also 
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necessarily a history of forgetting,”52 in that things forgotten can be recovered. Should 
Austerlitz not have pursued applying a specific meaning to seemingly ordinary things 
such as moth collections or building plans, their purposing becomes irrelevant and 
forgotten.  This actively requires an acknowledgment of an imparting of meaning to an 
object via memory—the meaning changes depending upon the memory, although the 
object remains unchanged. Through memory’s reimagining, meaning can be applied to 
silences and to spaces that once appeared to be vacant.  Forgetting and memory are in this 
way necessarily connected in each other’s functioning. Whitehead addresses Marc 
Augé’s proposed relationship between remembering and forgetting, writing that 
“forgetting is an active agent in the formation of memories, and it is because memory and 
oblivion stand together, are entirely ‘complicit’ with one another, that both are 
necessary.”53 However, forgetting cannot be too highly valued as a solution to living with 
traumatic memory. Forgetting can, Whitehead writes, “work against the solidification of 
narratives into too static or monumentalized a form.” Although, she continues, 
“forgetting cannot simply be prescribed in a manner that overlooks its difficulties, nor 
should the moral and ethical burdens of remembering be discounted.”54 Forgetting can in 
some ways be productive, but it certainly is not the ultimate solution for reconciling past 
narratives and memories with their re-imaginings. This attention to silences and absences 
as indicative of some sort of signifying remainder provides a productive space for the 
defining of traumatic memory.   
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For Austerlitz, traumatic memory seems to be very much within the experience of 
the everyday. This brings to the fore the question of whether the contours of the routine 
serve as a natural place for the delineation of the unspeakable?  It is after all in the 
remains of his life that he looks for clues to fill in the absences.  He feels that he is living 
in the “aftermath” of his own life, excavating it for clues as to what happened.  It is 
through his browsing of libraries, cafés, streets, and other less than obvious sites of the 
recent past’s decay that he inquires for meaning and memory. de Certeau comments on 
this combing of the ordinary social landscape, as buildings, ruins and the like “function as 
history, which consists in opening a certain depth within the present, but they no longer 
have the contents that tame the strangeness of the past with meaning.”55  Further, it seems 
that the things Austerlitz is driven to recover are the things that he is least able to bear:   
I saw balance sheets, registers of the dead, lists of every imaginable kind, 
and endless rows of numbers and figures, which must have served to 
reassure the administrators that nothing ever escaped their notice…I 
understood it all now, yet I did not understand it, for every detail that was 
revealed to me as I went through the museum from room to room and back 
again, ignorant as I feared I had been through my own fault, far exceeding 
my comprehension.56 
 
It is in the texture of the everyday that the details of trauma can be made in some way 
perceptible to others.  These lists, registers, and numbers become far more telling in their 
capacity to in some way document extreme human experience, although they are used for 
the purposes of rationalizing and quantifying experience. As Sebald suggests in his 
wording, if it could be easily documented, it could never escape the realm of 
comprehensibility and remain in the category of “milieu.” It is through the “details” being 	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Volume 2. Trans. Timothy J. Tomasik. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
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revealed that information may far exceed comprehension. This goal of recovery functions 
both in memory, and the more tangible everyday.  The representation of unspeakable 
experiences can be placed in a realm in which all of us function, but may not allocate 
appropriate attention.  It is through Sebald’s addressing of traumatic memory in the 
everyday that power is given to the potentialities of imaginative writing about the 
everyday as a point of access.  The world to which most people can relate can be the 
location of an engagement with an experience that was beforehand perhaps beyond the 
realm of understandable language.  
 Ultimately, Sebald’s text provides a place to explore the latitudes allowed by the 
fictional genre to investigate extreme human experiences and memory.  It poses the 
question of whether writing about memory necessarily displaces or destroys reality—
replacing what actually happened with what one wishes or is able to remember of it.  We 
are given the raw materials of experience, but are the editors of our own cognitive 
narratives. There are memories of crisis that defy this logic, and compulsively and 
involuntarily re-appear, but I ultimately argue that beyond those extenuating 
circumstances, we are both subject to and in creative control of the contours of our 
memories. As if by revisiting the memory, there are necessarily revisions of it in some 
capacity. Memory, much like the writing of literature, becomes a creative force, allowing 
for visions and revisions of our own stories—showing that we are both subject to and 
control how they are communicated.  Language functions much like how memory 
functions in that it has the potential to displace meaning and presence. Further, it is by 
contrasting imaginative literature with the seemingly objective truth of experience that 
the complications of memory become clear.  As per Kochhar-Lindgren, literature’s 
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“paradoxical essence is to pose the question of the truth of events in the act of writing 
without claiming the capacity to adequately respond to the question.”57  In the same way, 
memory functions as a creative force in which events are shaped and repeated.  Memory 
is a creative force in and of itself.  In the same way, literary and fictional modes of 
narrative come to be of use for engagement in that they always leave room for another 
(re)writing to occur. It necessarily renders us suspended about the status of the “real” but 
nonetheless more able to engage with what we take to be “real.”   
Shoah survivor and author Charlotte Delbo demonstrates this capacity of memory 
in describing that she does not live after Auschwitz, but “next to it.”58 Victoria Stewart 
draws attention to Delbo’s avoidance of describing the “ossification” of memory of the 
past in her writing, in favor of a constantly “changing relationship” to her memories of 
her Auschwitz self.59 It is through writing and the re-imagining of memory that the 
necessary attention is drawn to silences and seemingly empty space in narratives. 
Literature might draw attention to the artifice of the functioning of memory, but it is 
paradoxically that we acknowledge the uncertainty and constantly changing nature of 
memory that we can engage ourselves with the reality of how memory functions. 
Memory functions in many ways alongside imaginative writing in that both allow for a 
displacement of meaning through visions and revisions of the past. Literature can be 
useful in this manner in that it allows for a contemplation of the frustrations that 
witnesses to trauma experience in attempting to anchor their testimony into coherence. It 	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is through these kinds of engagement with texts and aspects of the everyday that the 
reader gains access to the concerns about the floating status of the “real.”  Ostensibly 
“objective” modes of representation are called into question in that meaning can be 
prescribed and reassigned on the basis of memory, and other shifting forces. In exploring 
the latitudes offered by imaginative writing to address extreme human experiences, 
reality and meaning become complicated in the possibilities of the creative powers of 
memory. Memory may fall short in the hope for strict objectivity or a clear, unchanging 
basis of meaning, but Sebald’s text allows for the exploration of how memory’s 
functioning is complicated in much the same way in which imaginative writing is in its 
addressing of real or historical events.  
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CHAPTER	  THREE	  	  
The Pleating of Time: empathic reading and redemptive memory in Michaels’s 
Fugitive Pieces 
_____________________________ 
 
 In narratives that attempt to give expression to elusive forms of undigested, un-
housed experiences of trauma, poetic language is positioned as an ambiguous tool for 
coherence.  Poetic language is supersaturated with expressiveness beyond simply the 
content and formal definitions of words, and can be used in order to mimic the 
fragmentary nature of memory that is otherwise difficult to communicate. As such, poetic 
language is well suited to the configurations of narratives of extreme human experiences. 
It is rather difficult to address the finer points of what makes a narrative of trauma or 
crisis particularly compelling without flattening the ideological contours of the text. Anne 
Michaels’s Fugitive Pieces serves as a quintessential example in attempting to reconcile 
the expressiveness of poetic language with the fragmentary nature of narratives of 
traumatic memory. The richness of ambiguity in poetic language’s usage somehow 
vibrates above and over mere definitions, syntax, and semantics. The plot of the novel is 
necessary as a vehicle, but is absolutely not the core of significance in the subject matter 
of the text.  The poetic preoccupations of the text grate against the traumatic narrative and 
bleeds into a layering of ideas surrounding memory, language, remembering, and 
forgetting—a gestalt that far exceeds the sum of its parts.  It is in this way that the 
intricate poetics and narration of Michaels’s text is not only felt viscerally, but functions 
evocatively for pleas for commemoration, and lends itself to the affirmation of the 
capacity of language for proffering empathy. 
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 The story that Fugitive Pieces tells is rather easy to turn into a summary, but 
fashions itself as more of a novel of multi-layered ideas surrounding memory, loss, and 
the healing of large emotional wounds. In order to ground my argument that despite an 
uncomplicated plot, Michaels’s text is exceedingly complex in its telling, I would like to 
offer a brief summary of the novel. The foundation of the plot will allow for a more 
finessed dissection of the poetic language and technique in providing a baseline 
understanding of the trajectory of Michaels’s narrative. The first two parts of the novel 
are narrated by a poet, Jakob Beer; and the third part is narrated by Ben, the child of 
concentration camp survivors.  Through a prefatory note, the reader knows that Jakob has 
recently been killed in a car accident, but just before his death, he had begun to write his 
memoirs. It is to be assumed that the first two parts narrated by Jakob are what he has 
written.  They are a first-person account of how as a young boy in Poland, he is 
concealed behind a cupboard door while the Nazis come for his family—his parents are 
killed immediately, and his older sister Bella is taken away.  He never sees their fate, but 
is only privy to the sounds and hi  own imaginings of what could have happened to Bella.  
Jakob hides himself in nearby bogs and forests, where he is found by a Greek 
archeologist, Athos, who is excavating the ancient Polish city of Biskupin.  Athos hides 
this mud-covered little boy from the German guards, and manages to smuggle him back 
to his home on the German-occupied Greek island of Zakynthos.  Athos keeps Jakob 
hidden there until the end of the war.  During his time in hiding, Athos shares his passion 
for geology, poetry, and language with Jakob—aiming to soothe some of Jakob’s pain, 
but not to encourage a forgetting of his past.  After the war, Athos takes a teaching post at 
a university in Toronto, offering Jakob a new language to learn and adopt.  Jakob attends 
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the university, where he meets and becomes dear friends with Maurice Salman.  Upon 
Athos’s death, Jakob finds and prepares Athos’s notes on the Nazi falsification of hisotyr 
into a book, which he titles Bearing False Witness.  Jakob has a brief, but unsuccessful 
marriage, and returns to the Greek island Idhra to live in Athos’s family home, where he 
spends his time translating Holocaust memoirs and writing poetry.  Jakob is still in touch 
with Maurice and his family, and on a visit to Toronto, he meets Michaela.  The two 
marry and return to Idhra, but shortly after, the couple is killed in a car accident.  At this 
point, the narrative is picked up by Ben, a friend of Maurice.  Ben’s narrative is 
addressed to Jakob, whose memoirs and journal he is attempting to find after Jakob’s 
death.  Ben has grown up in a shadowy specter of the Shoah, a child of concentration 
camp survivors who still live in a compulsive, residual fear. His wife Naomi seems to 
have a more connected relationship with his parents and their memories, which Ben 
increasingly resents.  After his parents have both died, Ben comes across a family secret 
that Naomi is already aware of, and his resentment reaches a point.  Ben admires Jakob’s 
poetry and becomes somewhat obsessed with his story.  At Maurice’s suggestion, he 
travels to Greece to find Jakob’s journals, allowing for a trial separation of sorts with 
Naomi.  In Jakob’s poetry, Ben finds connection to his own experience, and decides to 
return to his wife.   
 The aforementioned narrative plot that can be summed up in the space of about a 
page, but this has to be collected and pieced together by the reader—inferred from 
Jakob’s fragmented, heavily image-based memories.  The themes and ideas that inhabit 
the shape of the plot breathe such a sense of painful responsibility and inquisitiveness that 
even an analysis of the plot is wholly insufficient. The real artfulness of the text and 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
41	  
access for engagement are the aesthetic and poetic methods Michaels utilizes in her 
staging of the narrative.  The plot reveals by outline, by circling around a negative space.  
The summary of the plot is not the easy take-away message for the reader—the story is 
clear, but the narration and telling of the story are not.  As such, it is necessary to know 
the landscape of a text before attempting to impose some kind of order or shape over that 
which is ultimately deserving of attention.  The narrative voice works of several levels—
there is of course the telling of the past in a past tense, the reliving of memory in a 
reluctant but knowing present tense, and a tense of the conditional unknown—of 
numerous possibilities of the unseen but assumed. The majority of Jakob’s narration is 
done in the past tense, in which he pieces together events from his childhood, and 
eventually takes the form of the present tense, in the summer of 1992, indicating that he 
is writing his memoirs at Athos’s family home in Idhra, “where I now sit and write this, 
these many years later,” with the intention to “set down the past in the cramped space of a 
prayer.”60  Jakob’s memoir spans his whole life, but is somewhat unusual in what is 
chosen what time periods to be explored at length.  For example, his first marriage spans 
only a few pages, but his experience of learning English is allotted far more ink. For that 
matter, the piecemeal recollections do not reflect the incomplete comprehension expected 
of childhood memory.  The style of narration in the Jakob section of the text is somewhat 
opaque, indirect, and fragmented and it seems that he is telling the story for his benefit 
rather than the reader’s.  His is a narrative voice that provides the events Jakob is subject 
to, but never experiences directly.  The narration is suspended in a sense of the 
conditional—of imagined and re-imagined potential histories and events.  This style of 
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narration provides the events the narrator has not seen, but nonetheless obsesses him—
not necessarily problematizing, but adding complexity to his position as witness to his 
own experience. Jakob disperses small splinters of knowledge about the historical context 
that destroyed his family in his narrative, stating that “the facts of the war began to reach 
us.”61 These events also slip themselves into the narration as if they are enactments.  
They are never seen, but rendered in the present tense as if the narrator is present and 
witness to these events directly.  These enactments are never worded as possibilities, but 
stated in the present tense as potentialities that carry the validity and weight of fact.  
These potentialities make their intrusive presence known in much the way that traumatic 
memories impose themselves in an individual and cultural consciousness.  
 The use of the present tense becomes all the more loaded when considering Cathy 
Caruth’s insights into the way trauma repeats, intrudes, and repeats again. For Caruth, 
trauma is experienced as an unexpected and initially unassimilated event, the full force of 
comprehension impossible in the original moment. Caruth locates the “truth of trauma 
[as] delayed or belated in that it cannot be linked exclusively to what is known, to an 
immediate, verifiable and empirical reality.”62 Trauma, in this formulation, is manifested 
as a wound to the mind, rather than the corporeal—what Caruth locates as a “breach in 
the mind’s experience of time, self, and the world.”63 The single event cannot be taken in, 
processed, or understood at once, and therefore lodges itself into the contours of the 
unconscious. The traumatic event is consequently experienced and re-experienced by 
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“impos[ing] itself again, repeatedly, in the nightmares and repetitive actions of the 
survivor,” and as such “not locatable in the simple violent or original event in an 
individual’s past, but rather in the way that its very unassimilated nature-the way that it 
was precisely not known in the first instance-returns to haunt the survivor later on.”64 It is 
in this way that this persistent psychic return of the trauma “addresses us in an attempt to 
tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available.”65 This reality or truth can, in 
turn, only be linked to what is known of the traumatic experience, and can reveal itself in 
fragments, as it is not fully comprehended. This experience of crisis that is not 
completely assimilated poses a theoretical challenge when it comes to capturing the scope 
of an experience since it is “marked not by a simple knowledge, but by the ways it 
simultaneously defies and demands out witness.”66 To address what exactly it is in 
trauma that refuses a simple comprehension, Caruth looks to Freud, in the traumatic 
event’s shock and unexpectedness. The crisis “does not simply represent the 
violence…but also conveys the impact of its very incomprehensibility.”67 The narrative 
of a crisis, in this way, reflects both the truths of the occurrence, but also, more notably, 
how the violence of the crisis has not yet been fully comprehended. Caruth offers the 
explanation that the repeated tellings of trauma “as the narrative of a belated experience, 
far from telling of an escape from reality-the escape from a death, or from its referential 
force,” function to attest “to its endless impact on a life.”68 The experience of trauma is 
one that laments a violent reality, but also the agony of continuing to live beyond it. This 
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double-telling of the stories surrounding a traumatic event reflect an “oscillation between 
a crisis of death and the correlative crisis of life: between the story of the unbearable 
nature of an event and the story of the unbearable nature of its survival.”69 These two 
irreconcilable crises vex, but complicate a holistic and cohesive telling of an event of 
trauma, since “it does not serve merely as a memorial record of the past, but also 
‘registers the force of an experience’ that remains ‘unclaimed’ or un-owned, deracinated 
from authoritative schemes of prior knowledge.”70 Jakob laments this paradoxical nature 
of survival in writing, “to survive was to escape fate. But if you escape your fate, whose 
life do you then step into?”71 To tell of past trauma is somehow disconnected, and reflects 
the difficulty in moving beyond the experience of trauma when it is not yet completely 
known. The use of the present tense in Jakob’s narration of his past trauma exposes this 
struggle with the comprehension of the experience, as well as reflecting the way in which 
the force of the crisis re-asserts itself to the survivor through re-imaginings and 
nightmares.  
In one such instance of these re-imaginings, Jakob communicates the systematic 
slaughter of the ghettos of Crete through an enactment. When a young Jakob overhears a 
discussion between Ioannis and Athos on the decimation of the Jews of Crete by the 
Germans, the event is seemingly enacted directly:  “As he spoke, the room filled with 
shouts.  The water rose around us, bullets tearing the surface for those who took too long 
to drown.  Then the peaceful blue sheen of the Aegean slipped shut again.”72  Although 
the narrator has not experienced these events, they are enacted as if this is the case—	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narration inserting what has not been experienced.  This is the case over the repeated, 
obsessive imaginings of the possible fate of Jakob’s sister, Bella.  Over the years, Athos 
and Jakob try and fail to recover some clue as to what happened after she was taken from 
the family home.  But her end can only be imagined compulsively in a style similar to the 
enactments of the fate of the Jews of Crete, in visions fueled by the data of history.  
Bella’s unknown fate resounds itself in a way that Susan Gubar argues “links Jacob’s 
[sic] experience to the very crux of trauma, a response to an unexpectedly wounding 
event that cannot be grasped at the moment of its occurrence and thus returns.”73  These 
compulsive enactments of Bella’s potentialities appear embodied in Jakob’s narration and 
work to dislodge some of the power of the discourse of ‘fact,’ suggesting that these 
imaginings of the incomprehensible are paradoxically just as valid when the grounding 
for fact is abjectly outside the realm of communication.  Jakob’s state of witness and 
survivor is presented in a retrospective sense, only later beginning to understand what 
exactly he has survived.  He is never even physically witness the Nazi occupation of 
Greece, as he is hidden in a rather remote location in Athos’s home.  The reader of his 
narration is inherently asked to acknowledge and accept that the repeated obsessive 
imaginings always pull backward in a sense.  These re-imaginings compulsively re-
appear and mitigate the flow of the plot and progress of the narrative, thereby bringing 
the reader into the experience of a memory’s unwanted but involuntary intrusions. The 
process of narration in this way mirrors the influence of the past at large—in that it 
returns in flashbacks or imagined occurrences.  Such is reflected in Ben’s later narration 
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as well.  Ben, in his position of a second-generation witness to the Shoah, laments that in 
his family has “no energy of narrative…not even the fervor of an elegy.”74  The narrative 
strategy of the intrusions of past memory mitigating the progress of the plot mimics the 
influence of the past and of traumatic memory in that they are re-experienced and 
embedded in a present tense, calling for attention and coherence.  I suggest Michaels’s 
embedding of trauma in this lyrical present tense throughout mimics this experience of 
bringing the reader beyond the realm of describing trauma into actualizing its residual 
effect. In Toronto, years after the murder of his family, Jakob is returning from lunch in 
town with Athos when he is again seized with recollection. He writes,  
I stood on the darkening sidewalk and transformed the smell of car wax 
and mown lawns into curing leather and salted fish…the afternoon heat 
was thick with burning flesh. I saw the smoke rising in whorls into the 
dark sky. Ambushed, memory cracking open. The bitter residue flying up 
into my face like ash.75 
  
The experience of crisis asserts itself long after the original trauma occurred, and is 
differentiated from reflecting upon the experience in that it is integrated into events that 
are happening to the narrator in the present. This experience of “memory cracking open,” 
shows the involuntary nature of which crises are revisited in a perpetual present tense. 
They are re-lived and recycled in an attempting to bring to coherence a holistic sense of 
the experience. There is a sense in which one is never free from shards of memory 
emerging and situating themselves in a perfect present.  This narrative strategy invites the 
reader to question how an awareness of the use of narrative elements may bring a more 
engaged sense of coherence to even the level of second-generational or cultural memory.  
The reader is subject to the kind of tension between the present, the inescapable past and 	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haunting conditional potentialities that is reflected in traumatic testimony and memory.  It 
is within these contours of imagined potentialities that Michaels’s text provides a 
particularly lush point of access into traumatic memory.  The reader, by very virtue of 
engagement with the text, is put in a position for empathy with the narrator through this 
strained presence of imaginings and uncertainty of fact. But further, and more 
importantly, this engagement points to the value of empathic reading and a redemptive 
view of language’s complex and ambiguous functioning in its task of representation. 
It would seem par for the course to discuss Theodor Adorno’s well-worn 
arraignment against poetry, as ostensibly every article surrounding Auschwitz or the 
Shoah cites it as a crucial intersection between the events of the Shoah and their 
representation in literature and art. Adorno’s denouncement that “to write poetry after 
Auschwitz is barbaric”76 carries the weight of numerous interpretations and 
misappropriations, but generally appears to reject any aestheticization of the Shoah as a 
means for representation and subsequent consolation.  However, this is dependent on 
what Adorno refers to by the term “poetry.”  In his text, Adorno refers to poetry as a 
mass-produced cultural art form du jour.  His denouncement centers on a call for a 
different kind of engagement with cultural criticism, rather than rejection of poetry as an 
artistic mode of representation.  These mass-produced social art forms are ineffective at 
provoking engagement and thought, and through his Hegelian dialectical approach, 
Adorno situates culture as fully amalgamated with society’s economic agenda. As such, 
cultural criticism reflects the concerns of the system, and in doing so inherently validates 
the system.  He writes that because of the “existence of cultural criticism, no matter what 	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its content, depends on the economic system, it is involved in the fate of the system.”77  
He rejects this notion of cultural criticism further, writing that “what makes the content of 
cultural criticism inappropriate is not so much lack of respect for that which is criticized 
as the dazzled and arrogant recognition which criticism surreptitiously confers on 
culture.”78  It is not the subject matter that makes the representations and critiques of 
Auschwitz testimonies problematic; rather, it is the presumptuousness of the form of 
cultural criticism. Adorno wants to dislodge the smug, easy conclusions provided by 
cultural critics in favor of something that works to unsettle and provide a space for a 
more self-reflexive, engaged examination.  His vision for poetry and cultural criticism 
after Auschwitz avoids the temptations of “forget[ting] the unutterable, instead of 
striving, however impotently, so that man may be spared,” with the ideal of evoking “the 
advanced state of the human spirit.”79  In this regard, Adorno is aware of the ambiguous 
nature of language, but does not decry the use of literature as a means to represent the 
unutterable.  Literature and high literary language is positioned at the borderlands of 
knowing and not knowing, which both mimic the experience of and is suitable for 
understanding the form of traumatic memory. His intention is that the experiences of an 
unutterable nature are not forgotten.  Méira Cook positions Adorno’s dictum as a double-
gestured warning and summons to the writer.  She highlights the ethical elements in 
imaginative writing, indicating that his pronouncement is a: 
stern warning that in the wake of the Holocaust it must find new ways to 
represent the elisions and failures of grief when it is used as a system of 
discourse.  The problem of writing after is also the problem of how to 
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represent the impossible event faithfully without avoiding a betrayal of 
both history and of the victim.80 
 
Cook points to the problem as fundamentally one of representation. What comes into 
question in her problematizing of faithful representation is whether language can handle 
the ethical heavy-lifting required in addressing “the impossible event” without inattention 
or a betrayal to the victim. Engaging with the question of whether literature can and 
should bear witness is central to Adorno’s dilemma, but I would prefer to side-step the 
dialogue surrounding the ethical concerns of verisimilitude to the experience of the 
victim and survivor. Literature is inherently a complex construction, consisting of layers 
of art and artifice. The issue of the dubious ethical ground that fiction enters into when 
attempting to represent historical events goes without saying and is integrally 
presumptuous. My aim is to engage literature as a form, and I would like to focus my 
attention upon how Michaels takes up Adorno’s imperative and reflects some of his 
concerns.  
Michaels addresses some of the imagery that Adorno would directly consider 
“unutterable,” but takes a somewhat apologetic tone in attempting to represent such an 
image through language.  In a passage describing the image of twisted, newly deceased 
bodies upon the opening of the doors to a gas chamber in a concentration camp, the 
narrative voice pleads for forgiveness from the victims.  Realizing the danger of 
attempting to bring to coherence the obscenity of the unimaginable, the narrative voice 
states, “Forgive this blasphemy, of choosing philosophy over the brutalism of fact.”81  
Michaels’s language points to the problematics of choosing to represent unimaginably 	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grotesque and indescribable human actions—choosing the philosophy of affect over the 
silent respect that historical fact imparts.  She chooses to give voice to something that 
should perhaps remain in a registered and respected silence, but instead consciously 
chooses the presumptuousness of imagination.  This mistrust and self-consciousness 
surrounding the “blasphemy” of imagination and language holds the responsibility that 
despite this insufficiency of language, attempts must be made if any sense of recovery or 
reclamation is to be achieved. This line of thought continues with the narrative voice 
reluctantly attempting to communicate the unspeakable, and to attempt to conjure the 
thoughts of the brutalized. The narrative voice states, “It is impossible to imagine,” but 
indicates that the effort to represent is also an effort at reclamation and restoration:  
At that moment of utmost degradation, in that twisted reef, is the most 
obscene testament of grace.  For can anyone tell with absolute certainty 
the difference between the sounds of those who are in despair and the 
sounds of those who want desperately to believe?  The moment when our 
faith in man is forced to change, anatomically--mercilessly--into faith.82 
 
Michaels’s statement positions certainty and faith in tension with each other in 
such a way that Adorno’s call for a self-reflexive examination is answered—but 
limited.  Michaels engages with the ethical perils in attempting not only to 
imagine, but to vocalize and reflect philosophically upon these unspeakable 
experiences.  In drawing attention to the forced engagement with these 
unanswerable questions of “can anyone tell,” the redemption is in faith.  The facts 
of the trauma are inherently outside the constraints of language, but the attempt at 
poetics and representation is in the name of something preferable to silence.  
While silence can still be articulate, it in some way elevates the atrocities of 
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genocide to an almost religious fetishism.  Paul Celan, quoted in Felstiner, 
cautions against silence despite the corruptions of language, writing, “within 
reach, close and not lost, there remained, in the midst of the losses, this one thing: 
language…but it had to pass through its own answerless, pass through a frightful 
falling mute.”83  Silence must be respected, but language must retrieve meaning 
and faith from impossibility. Engaging with these hypothetical representations is 
more productive than silence surrounding the matter.  As a poet, Michaels cannot 
escape language as her medium in order to achieve this, but her caution and care 
are present in her suspicion of language.  Perhaps Michaels’s credence to 
Adorno’s sentiment takes the form of her highly self-conscious and qualified use 
of language throughout the text.  Michaels’s solution to Adorno’s mistrust of 
artistic cultural criticism is to bring traumatic narratives to the realm of poetic 
techniques and language. Cook cautions “language is potent only insofar as it 
escapes the boundaries of received meaning,”84 and as such, poetic techniques 
open the doors of perception to the effective and redemptive use of language.  The 
somewhat more lavish possibilities of poetic language allow for more liberties 
than testimonial prose, and may work to evade the scope of concern set forth in 
Adorno’s dictum.  Michaels accepts that language is insufficient, but that the poet 
must self-reflexively turn back to it in order to express what they desire.  I do not 
view Michaels’s text necessarily as a defense of the poetic form, but rather as a 
voice echoing Adorno—cautioning for self-reflexive engagement and respect.  
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The text is heavily entrenched in a mistrust of language, as I would like to 
explore, but assures us that such a leap of faith is not wasted.  
 Michaels’s demand of a leap of faith when it comes to entrusting representation to 
the capacities of language is undoubtedly the result of a complex relationship of a poet to 
her tools.  The poet must choose language, despite its obvious inadequacies, in lieu of the 
safety of silence. In the essay, “Cleopatra’s Love,” Michaels meditates on her approach to 
language, lamenting the poet’s addressing the tension between silence and the capacity of 
words.  She resigns herself to the “inevitable failure of language,”85 to fully describe 
human experience, that instead it simply outlines the experience without gaining access 
to it directly.  She writes of this tension as “a peculiar courtship…the inevitable failure of 
language haunts integrity.  Over the years I turn away continually, defer to the silence of 
experience…we like to think language is nothing without us, but in the end, it’s we who 
beg it back.”86  Language takes the form of a symbiotic yet degenerative relationship.  
Michaels’s comment that language haunts integrity indicates the strong feelings of 
suspicion and resentment harbored against language, but a reluctant dependence on the 
part of the poet.  The poet inevitably begs language back because of the need for a 
medium.  I argue that the position of the poet mirrors that of a witness in that the need to 
profess outstrips the acknowledged inadequacies of testimony’s communication. Why do 
words simply fall short for a poet in this relationship of dependence?  Michaels suggests 
that the unease is based in the idea that “language abandons experience every time,” and 
that the paradoxical power of words “is that it makes our ignorance more precise.”87  
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Words, the very vehicle for the illumination of knowledge, function to expose our 
ignorance and subsequent impotence.  This is further echoed in her poem, “What the 
Light Teaches.”  She writes: 
We can only reveal by outline, 
by circling absence. 
But that’s why language 
can remember truth when it’s not spoken. 88 
 
She expresses that words can only “reveal by outline,” and cannot describe directly.  The 
use of language can try and gain access to the experience, but cannot ensnare it.  In our 
very attempt at representation of truth, we are exposed as well-meaning failures—
language can “remember truth,” but not gain access to it. With language, the poet can 
only outline the experience that they are not able to describe. In referring to this 
ineffectual relationship between words and their revealing of ineptitude, Michaels 
defends language with what she calls a “futile hope.” This notion of futile hope functions 
in “attempting to represent experience, we’ll capture what’s there, even if it’s hidden that 
we’ll somehow render the invisible visible, like the painter who learns the geology of a 
landscape before he attempts to paint it.”89 Michaels asserts that the poet’s unease with 
language must be ultimately reconciled as flawed, but not failed.  Despite that words can 
only construct an outline around the perimeter of experience, that experience is still 
within language.  Language signals its own intention, and can swell around its object, but 
only draw attention to it from the outside.  The redemption of the futile hope is that 
although it cannot directly describe experience, it can gesture at it in the hope that an 
engagement with the outline can foster and understanding of its content. 
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 In addition to the shortcomings of direct description, a certain amount of mistrust 
is healthy on the part of the poet in that language is an ambiguous tool. Language is a 
large part of the way in which culture and memory are communicated, and as such 
Michaels writes that language actively “remembers.”  Language as a vessel or receptacle 
for memory holds particular emotive powers when invoked.  For example, seemingly 
neutral and innocuous nouns like “oven,” “showers,” or “number” become loaded with 
historical connotation.  Neutral on their own, but when juxtaposed, these terms become 
clear signifiers of memory and history.  Memory and history can become embedded 
within language, imposing themselves at will.   As such, language can be shaped and 
molded to fit the desires or motives, which is potentially dangerous. Michaels cautions 
that, 
if language can be enriched, it can also be poisoned: if language is a 
repository of memory, it is also a repository of history. The simple 
absorption of events without ethical consideration can be devastating. The 
most obvious example is the euphemism: the exploding bomb referred to 
as ‘energy release,’ the dangerous breakdown of equipment that ‘fails to 
meet functioning criteria as per design requirements.’ At its most extreme, 
this abuse of language is perpetuated precisely in order to render the 
immoral, moral. As we well know, the fact is not always the truth. While 
metaphor uses ‘fabrication’ to get at a truth, euphemism uses fact in order 
to mislead.90 
 
The threat of distortion is at the heart of a mistrust of language.  Language may absorb 
some historical events and re-frame them into something that masquerades as truth.  
Descriptions of vile realities may be constructed to appear more palatable, rendering the 
immoral, moral—as mentioned.  Civilians become “non-enemy combatants,” or a 
genocide becomes an “ethnic cleansing” — these distortions are extremely dangerous in 
that they are then propagated in the writing of memory, and the telling and retelling of 	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history.  These distorted terms are absorbed into language for (mis)use, posing as 
gestures to historical truths.  It is these distortions of language being communicated as 
historical truths that Michaels takes up in Fugitive Pieces. The character Athos begins 
writing a book concerning the Nazi falsification of history, and how these distortions are 
shielded within a historical discursive regime of “fact.”  In addition to euphemism, Jakob 
addresses how the Nazi use of metaphor sanitized and attempted to give reason to 
genocide.  Jakob writes that Nazi policy towards the Jews was “beyond racism,” as Jews 
were not held to be human. That what they used was,  
an old trick of language, often used in the course of history. Non-Aryans 
were never to be referred to as human, but as ‘figuren,’ ‘stücke’- ‘dolls,’ 
‘wood,’ ‘merchandise,’ ‘rags.’ Humans were not being gassed, only 
‘figuren,’ so ethics weren’t being violated. No one could be faulted for 
burning debris, for burning rags and clutter in the dirty basement of 
society. In fact, they’re a fire hazard! What choice but to burn them before 
they harm you…So the extermination of Jews was not a case of obeying 
one set of moral imperatives over another, but rather the case of the larger 
imperative satisfying any difficulties.91 
 
Such drastic repositioning of reference via “an old trick” of language is testament to the 
amount of sway that language holds in shaping moral imperatives.  Not only must we 
mistrust language in order for it to succeed, we must mistrust it for its huge capacity to 
carry the connotations of truth. By use of metaphor, the German language reduced an 
entire segment of humanity to non-beings.  In this way, Jakob remarks that in the 
“turning [of] humans into objects…the German language annihilated metaphor.” Further, 
this functions as “the step from language/formula to fact: denotation to detonation.”92  
Meaning can be invented and imposed upon language independent of truth in a discourse 
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of “fact.”  Language must hold the weight of memory in its very usage, drawing the 
expression to its historical grounding—whether invented or otherwise.   
 What is to be said of connotation in the translation among languages?  Do the 
“old tricks” of language migrate across multiple tongues, or can lines in the sand be 
drawn when prescribing meaning or connotation to a word? To that extent, when 
addressing culturally embedded narratives, is it possible for their profundity and force to 
be effectively realized and translated? Does memory travel among different languages; 
and if not, can one escape traumatic memory through a change of tongue? Such is the 
concern carried by Jakob upon his immigration to Toronto and his subsequent learning of 
English.  Initially, Jakob sees English as an opportunity for freedom from the traumatic 
memory attached to his mother tongue, writing that “there’s a heavy black outline around 
things separated from their names.”  In his learning, he attempts to “bury images, to cover 
them over with Greek and English words,” and imagines the learning of a new language 
as a potential for freedom: “the numb tongue attaches itself, orphan, to any sound it can: 
it sticks, tongue to cold metal. Then, finally, many years later, tears painfully free.”93  
Jakob sees an opportunity for freedom from his past in adopting a new tongue for reasons 
of escaping connotation.  When he begins to recall the events of his past, he sees the 
potential for the freedom from the trappings of memory in language. He states, “when I 
began to write down the events of my childhood in a language foreign to their happening, 
it was a revelation. English could protect me; an alphabet without memory.”94 These 
hopes are frustrated when his new tongue does not displace the memories of the past.  He 
busies himself learning facts and usage during his waking; but remarks, “At night, my 	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mother, my father, Bella, Mones, simply rose, shook the earth from their clothes and 
waited.”95  He realizes that he cannot escape memory in language through a change in 
tongue.  In this discovery, he approaches language and ‘naming’ from a redemptive 
outlook.  He takes the power of metaphor and the imbuing meaning upon language, and 
focuses it upon the expressive power of poetry and other imaginative writing:  
My life could not be stored in any language but only in silence; the 
moment I looked into the room and took in only what was visible, not 
vanished…If I could isolate that space, that damaged chromosome in 
words, in an image, then perhaps one could restore order by naming. 
Otherwise history is only a tangle of wires. So in poems I returned to 
Biskupin, to the house on Zakynthos, to the forest, to the river, to the burst 
door, to the minutes in the wall. English was a sonar, a microscope, 
through which I listened and observed, waiting to capture elusive 
meanings buried in facts. I wanted a line in a poem to be the hollow ney of 
the dervish orchestra whose plaintive wail is a call to God.96 
 
Jakob sees truth only in the form of silence, but simultaneously sees potential for 
expression in the spaces held by this silence.  He seeks to pursue the spaces of absence 
and saturate them with naming, or language, of his own control. He attempts to reclaim 
experience through words.  He responds to absence with creation.  The work that is of his 
creation is of the fragmented nature by design: “every letter askew, so that loss would 
wreck the language, become the language.”97 Michaels cautions that one must mistrust 
language in order for it to ultimately succeed, and demonstrates this through Jakob’s 
recognition of silence as the only way to define his truths. However, silence does not 
function as a solution, and Jakob instead chooses the creation of fragmented language as 
a means for the kind of productive, self-reflexive examination of self and culture that 
Adorno puts forth.  Susan Gubar also endorses the restorative capacity of fragmented 	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language, in that these pieces of language, “provide Jakob moments of escape, self-
protective concealment, and excavation.” Further, Jakob’s approach of creation in lieu of 
absence, “informs Michaels’s meditations on the ethical functions served by literature, 
which can prompt the imagination to enlarge consciousness of where the parameters of 
self reside.”98 Gubar cites the larger ethical imperative of a reader’s engagement with 
such language, and this expanded consciousness and sense of self is something to which I 
would like to draw attention.  Translation functions not to silence, to disguise, or even to 
rename memories, but to show that some degree the meaning can be accessed, even when 
the memory only returns in fragments, outside the realm of its occurrence. Michaels’s 
inclusion of a second-generation narrator, Ben, as well as the student/teacher relationship 
between Athos and Jakob point to both the importance of communicating knowledge and 
memory to future generations, and others via texts and other forms of art.   
 Jakob’s experiences are fragments to him—outside shards of experience, and in 
order to create a holistic sense of experience, and he arranges these fragments as well as 
absences or negative experiences via language.  This bringing together of the visible and 
invisible, present and absent ultimately constitutes the quintessential role of poetics and 
makes them invaluable to the propagation of experience to posterity and others through 
empathy.  Gubar differentiates the reader feeling sympathy for and empathy with the 
subjects of a narrative in this text through Michaels’s choices of gender.  Michaels 
differentiates herself from main characters by gender, and this works to acknowledge 
herself as an outside observer of trauma from the Jakob’s state of witness and 
victimhood.  In this way, she situates herself as imagining the suffering of others. Gubar 
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writes that, “the disjunction between [Michaels] as a woman writer and her masculine 
subjects dramatizes Michaels’s efforts to replace the concept of sympathy, which 
supposes affinity among people, with the mechanisms of empathy, with its recognition of 
disparity.”99 Borrowing upon Dominick LaCapra’s concept of “empathic unsettlement” 
and Martha Nussbaum’s concept of “empathic identification,” it is the reader’s 
engagement through language and reading that engenders empathy with a traumatized 
consciousness.  Nussbaum’s concept of “empathic identification” serves to contrast the 
feelings of pity for a character with the imagining of a kind of co-suffering with the 
character.  Pity is characterized by the awareness that oneself is distinctly disconnected 
from the sufferer, “it is for another, and not oneself, that one feels.” Empathy fosters an 
engagement with the sufferer in that “if one really had the experience of feeling the pain 
in one’s own body, then one would precisely have failed to comprehend the pain of 
another as other.”100 Empathic identification involves imagining the pain of the sufferer 
as one’s own, thereby removing a space of separation between the self and the other. This 
fosters a greater ability to engage with the text, while still recognizing one’s own alterity.  
LaCapra’s delineates “empathic unsettlement” in a similar manner, as a condition that 
“involves a kind of virtual experience through which one puts oneself in the other’s 
position while recognizing the difference of that position and hence not taking the other’s 
place.”101 It is through empathic identification and unsettlement that the redemptive 
power of poetry and language becomes possible.  I wish to return to Adorno for a 
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moment in referencing the capacity of language to evoke a sense of unsettlement. It is 
through this identification yet retention of alterity that Adorno’s goal of a self-reflexive, 
engaged examination of cultural criticism is actualized. It is through an identification and 
“feeling with” of the characters that the reader can place themselves into the position of 
engaging with the ideas of a text.  Neither pity nor the delusion of becoming the other 
facilitates this opportunity for engagement and learning.  It is in the engagement with 
these memories of the past and trauma that these experiences can in some way be 
resurrected and reclaimed.  
 It is in this desire for an engaged readership that such focus is placed upon the 
virtues of reading, writing, and teacher-learner relationships.  Through empathy and 
engagement, poetry and art effectively serve as realms of healing escapes.  Focusing 
upon Jakob’s learning under Athos’s tutelage, Gubar writes that “the reading process 
affords the most important entrée to ‘empathic unsettlement’…because reading generates 
an intersubjective form of being-in-relation with otherness, but without the threat of an 
actual, living other.”102  Reading establishes a place of refuge, and fosters a sense of 
coherent relationship between a “here” and “there.”  Writing also engages with this 
capacity of empathy, as present in Jakob’s ghost-writing and bringing to completion of 
Athos’s book after his death.  Empathy serves as a kind of witnessing by proxy, by 
“preserving memory as well as its poignant inability to provide adequate knowledge of or 
recompense for the dead.”103  This also involves a similar necessary avoidance of the 
proxy-witness maintaining delusions of becoming the other—it is composing both with 
and for the witness.  There is still space for the individual subjecthood of both the witness 	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and proxy-witness.  This encourages feeling with and a sense of responsibility for the 
past, but also functions to collapse time. This collapsing of time produces a doubling of 
moments into an endless potential return to be experienced—and giving potential for a 
healing reflection to occur.  Jakob refers to this as a resurrection of history, stating, 
“every recorded event is a brick of potential, or precedent, thrown into the future.  
Eventually the idea will hit someone in the back of the head.  This is the duplicity of 
history: an idea recorded will become an idea resurrected.”104  This type of empathic 
reading not only resurrects history, but offers an imaginative venue for its excavation in a 
more embodied sense.  Gubar writes that the engaged, empathic mode of reading offers 
Jakob a way to “‘pleat time’ so as to inhabit his own ‘now and the narrative’s invisible 
‘then,’ his own ‘here and the story’s mysterious ‘there,’ gaining him entrance into 
‘parallel images.’”105  The idea is neither to externalize nor fully assimilate the narrative 
of the other.  The reader still maintains his or her sense of alterity from the narrator, but is 
able to excavate the past in a way that brings the past into full view for inspection.  
Further, it allows for a better view of a more lived, embodied experience of the past. 
Referencing this complexity of considering narratives of trauma, Williams writes that, 
“the aporia (or seemingly irresolvable tension) that the instance of trauma creates can 
never be approached in a straightforward manner.”106 Caruth suggests that 
representations of trauma are approached and “spoken in a language that is always 
somehow literary: a language that defies, even as it claims, our understanding.”107 
Through this literary language, we are given access to “a literary dimension [to a 	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narrative of trauma] that cannot be reduced to the thematic content of the text or to what 
the theory encodes,” and “beyond what we can know or theorize about it, stubbornly 
persists in bearing witness to some forgotten wound.”108 Through empathic readings of a 
literary rendering of trauma, we are less inclined towards theoretical readings and 
limitations. We have the potential to engage with the text and appreciate its 
inconsistencies, fragmentary nature, or silences as markers of authenticity. Silences and 
fragments are not absences of memory, but illuminating demarcations and complexity of 
recollection. Poetic, literary language is supersaturated with poignancy exceeding merely 
the content and formal definitions of words, and can be used in order to register the effect 
of the fragmented nature of memory that is otherwise difficult to construe. Through this 
mode of engaged consciousness in empathic readings, one is able to access and embrace 
ways of being that are potentially quite distinct and different from one’s own.  Michaels 
refers to this state of a more fully engaged consciousness with memory via empathy as a 
state of “poetic knowing.”   
 Michaels differentiates ordinary knowledge from the epistemological mode of 
“poetic knowing” in that the latter is accessible through empathy, and functions to add 
the elements of meani g to historical memory.  Poetic knowing distinguishes itself in that 
it may reclaim some of the space for corruption present in language, by saturating the 
space of memory with a sense of morality, rather than a wholly malleable space.  Poetic 
knowing is, what I would like to argue, the result of empathic readings, and paramount to 
the reclamation and commemoration of the traumatic events of the past.  To remember is 
redemptive, especially when it is approached with an enlarged sense of the limits of the 
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self.  As Jakob states in the novel, that “history is amoral: events occurred. But memory 
is moral; what we consciously remember is what our conscience remembers.”109 History 
is an unattached set of registers, records of the victors and victims of the past. Memory is 
what is of import to be remembered and propagated to future generations, the 
consciousness of the individual absorbed through culture.  Michaels writes that,  
memory, like love, gains strength through restatement, reaffirmation; in a 
culture, through ritual, tradition, stories, art. Memory courts our better 
selves; it helps us recognize the importance of deed; we learn from 
pleasure just as we learn from pain. And when memory evokes 
consideration of what might have been or been prevented, memory 
becomes redemptive. As Israeli poet Yehudi Amichai wrote: “to 
remember is a kind of hope.”110 
 
Michaels highlights that memory is strengthened by repetition, and that memory serves a 
redemptive function when it is engaged with in a thoughtful manner.  It is in this way that 
the intricate poetics that foster an empathic reading function evocatively for 
commemoration. The nature of a narrative of trauma is that it is a brutalized ongoing 
realization, still making itself known. Through poetics, we are given access to an 
evolving history and realization, and are able to encounter the irresolvable tensions and 
strangeness that constitute the “ethos of being”111 in extreme human experiences. 
Memory and narrative are necessarily separate to a degree, but narration in conjunction 
with literary techniques can bring the force and resonance of a crisis to the fore, and 
mimic the residual experiences of trauma in an embodied manner. Embodied, empathic 
understandings are a benefit to the task of remembering, and can serve as authenticating 
elements with attention to faithful representations. It is living in a world after Auschwitz 
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110 Michaels, Anne. “Cleopatra’s Love,” 15. 
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that we need to remember—and to remember empathically.  If we are to establish some 
kind of relationship with the devastating reality of genocide in historical modernity, and 
to understand how and if it is capable to emerge from such an event with the capacity for 
healing, faith, and hope—it is through poetic knowing.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 	  
Vigilant Memory and the Literary Imagination: Defending Empathy, Elegy, and 
Cultures of Commemoration in the Modern Condition 
_____________________________ 
 
 In the previous sections, I have explored the ways in which imaginative writing 
and poetic knowing allow for an engagement with the “real” that is not found in 
nonfiction testimony. The imaginative realm of representation, outside of verifiable fact, I 
have argued is a productive space for engaging with the essence of experiences of 
trauma. Paradoxically structured, imaginative renderings are characterized by creative 
liberties that allow for a more expressive and articulate representation than the space of 
empirical fact. The epistemological mode of poetic knowing that Michaels introduces—
and I adopt in evoking meaning and morality from memory—functions in a larger sense 
of elegy and commemoration that I have yet to fully explain. But first, let us return 
quickly to the differentiation I have drawn between ordinary knowledge and poetic 
knowing, and the respective work of the latter. Ordinary knowledge or knowing is of the 
realm of empirical truths and regimes of fact. This is the kind of knowledge that claims 
jurisdiction over history, and rote rehashings of events. Poetic knowing is linked with 
morality, accessed through the functioning of empathy, and distinguished through the 
expressiveness of poetic language. Nussbaum articulates this distinction, writing that 
history “simply records what in fact occurred, whether or not it represents a general 
possibility for human lives. Literature focuses on the possible, inviting its readers to 
wonder about themselves.”112 In this way, poetic knowing accessed through imaginative 
literature fosters an embodied engagement with subject matter, and encourages a sense of 	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  Nussbaum, Martha. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life. Boston:  
Beacon Press, 1995. 5. 
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responsibility, closing the gap between larger collective significance and personal 
meaning.  
Poetic knowing is the meeting place of public record and private responsibility. I 
previously discussed how poetic knowing is fundamental to commemoration and the 
redemptive work of memory—especially when it comes to narratives of trauma or crisis. 
Through the expressiveness of poetic language, the associated disengagement from the 
received meaning of words, and an enlarged sense of self and responsibility through 
empathic identification and unsettlement, the essence of traumatic memory becomes 
accessible.  Empathic identification and poetic knowing become a modus operandi of 
suspending self-consciousness in favor of engaging fully with an extreme human 
experience. It is through this kind of embodied engagement with the experience of the 
other that a sense of responsibility expands beyond the self. From this expanded sense of 
identity and responsibility, we can better take on the task of commemoration, 
reclamation, and regeneration in the wake of trauma. I wish to bring some of the concerns 
I raise in my treatments of Michaels and Sebald, and concentrate upon what literature 
actively invites the reader to think about and engage with. As such, in this closing 
chapter, I would like to focus my attention upon the larger areas of empathy, 
commemoration, and the licenses of narrativity therein. 
 Let me first turn to the concepts of empathic identification and empathic 
unsettlement. These concepts imply a recognition of the degree to which a literary text 
invites the active participation of the reader. As I’ve discussed previously with relation to 
Anne Michaels’s text, it is through empathy that the reader feels with the narrator of the 
text, and this fosters some sense of identification and responsibility. Ultimately, writers 
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such as Sebald and Michaels that are working in the legacy of the Shoah have some sense 
of elegiac identification with the atrocity, and are working to give some shape to how it is 
to be remembered and commemorated. Without actually being witness to the atrocities, 
however, they are left with the task of imaginatively constructing narratives of crisis in a 
way that the force of the experience is kept intact.  It is not the aim of the imaginative 
force of memory to create some sort of alternate reality of fantasy or wish-fulfillment—
but rather a more tangible, sensory gestalt of an experience. The essence of an elusive 
experience is brought into greater view through poetic means, and fundamentally it is the 
greater experience of imaginative engagement with the text that is desired. I argue that 
this is best done through literary techniques and expressive poetic language, which are 
better able to represent the ethos of trauma. These experiences of trauma or crisis are 
characterized by their fragmentary nature and a dependence upon a sensory mode of 
remembering that lend themselves more easily to the elevated use of poetics. The 
truncated language and methods of juxtaposition of poetics in some capacity escape the 
easily received meaning of words. This ultimately allows for constructing the sense of 
being in an experience rather than the description of an experience itself. In having access 
to something of the experience of crisis, the reader may function as a kind of witness-by-
proxy to the trauma. Through empathic identification, the trauma is neither externalized 
nor fully assimilated by the reader, which fosters for a complex relationship with and 
consideration of the text. In this way, empathic identification allows for a suspension of 
time in memory, and permits an ongoing assessment and vigil upon the past, leaving it 
open for engagement and contemplation. 
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Empathy comes to the fore in its ability to minimize the space between personal 
narrative and public implication through imaginative means. I would like to focus on how 
empathy functions beyond the literary realm, and emphasize the importance of how the 
representations of trauma or otherwise “obscene testament[s] of grace”113 function as a 
mode of public significance. Martha Nussbaum refers to the concept of the “literary 
imagination,” in relationship to public life and makes a similar argument that the 
capacities of empathy are imperative to the understanding of the other. She is not by any 
means suggesting the substitution of imaginatively based empathy for empirical 
reasoning. However, she integrates the literary imagination into a larger construct of 
public rationality. The concept of the literary imagination comes into play for my 
argument in introducing the question of the utility in the telling of stories in the face of 
the knowledge that hatred, oppression and genocide still need to be dealt with. These 
stories may give embodied meaning to memory of the past, but what does that outwardly 
do? I have argued that literature supplies elements of reality that empirically-based 
regimes of knowledge do not. Nu sbaum writes that literature expresses, “a sense of life 
that is incompatible with the vision of the world embodied in the texts of political 
economy; and engagement with it forms the imagination and the desires in a manner that 
subverts that science’s norms of rationality.”114 Through Nussbaum’s construction, at 
first blush it seems political economy and literature are at odds with the way the world is 
seen through their respective frames. She argues that political economy comes under 
threat when the anti-economical modes of feeling and empathizing are represented and 
performed. The literary imagination, in this way, functions as “an essential ingredient of 	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an ethical stance that asks us to concern ourselves with the good of other people whose 
lives are distant from our own.”115 For Nussbaum, political economy and literature cannot 
be at odds with each other, in that they are both independently incomplete. She adds that 
a rule-governed system is needed, but one not bereft of the cognitive role of emotion. I 
think this conception of monolithic categories of literature and political economy is too 
forbidding; however, the importance of the roles of affect and empathy in literature 
deserve a place of importance in the public sphere. Without a demarcated space for 
emotion and empathy, “an ethics of impartial respect for human dignity will fail to 
engage real human beings unless they are made capable of entering imaginatively into the 
lives of distant others and to have emotions related to that participation.”116 The literary 
imagination functions in order to cultivate motives for compassionate and just behavior in 
relating to others who are potentially unlike one’s self in the interest of a larger sense of 
solidarity. Political economy and society at large are full of occasions for refusals to 
imagine one another empathically or with a degree of compassion. These refusals of 
compassion undermine one’s ability to imagine and understand the concrete ways in 
which perhaps non-normative “others” grapple with issues that may not directly affect 
oneself. Nussbaum argues that this is not a defect of humanity, but a defect in the lack of 
cultivation and encouragement of empathic identification and the literary imagination. 
She writes that,  
the remedy for that defect [refusal of compassion] seems to be, not the 
repudiation of fancy, but its more consistent and humane cultivation; not 
the substitution of impersonal institutional structures for the imagination, 
but the construction of institutions, and institutional actors, who more 
perfectly embody, and by institutional firmness protect, the insights of the 	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compassionate imagination…Institutions themselves should also be 
informed by “fancy’s” insight.117 
 
Institutional recognition of the importance of empathy testifies to the value of human 
dignity in our social and political actions, and affirms the literary imagination as an 
essential component of achieving some sense of social justice. Nussbaum limits her 
argument to novels as the form of literature best suited to the task of embodying the 
potential of the literary imagination, but I would especially like to extend it to the mode 
of imaginatively-based personal narratives of crisis. This form still allows for the same 
kind of engagement with the elements of affect that novels do in implying links of 
possibility between the reader and the subject. It is these links of possibility drawn for the 
reader that function actively to nurture empathic identification. The emotional 
identification and reaction on the part of the reader ultimately “cut[s] through those self-
protective stratagems, requiring [the reader] to see and respond to many things that may 
be difficult to confront—and they make this process palatable by giving [the reader] 
pleasure in the very act of confrontation.”118 Through the reading of these imaginative 
texts, the reader is placed in a position to see the concrete concerns of others from a 
slightly removed position. But the reader may simultaneously engage in and integrate this 
larger empathic identification with the other into acknowledging their dignity and 
humanity. In this way, one can encounter the experience and concerns of others 
imaginatively, and gain a greater understanding of a social or political issue that may not 
directly affect oneself otherwise. In other words, we are forced to confront problems and 
experiences that we may otherwise not have access to, and may imaginatively engage 
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with the lives of others. In looking towards a larger practical public significance, reading 
and imaginative engagement are valuable. This is especially true in a democratic society 
in the formation of our opinions and voting on issues such as discretionary social 
spending, or other concerns that may not directly affect an individual’s demographic, but 
still require that compassion be extended. In order to be a more informed, democratic 
society, the humanity and dignity of the individual must be maintained, and the exercise 
of empathy and compassion is integral to achieving this. As such, empathic identification 
serves a much more socially valuable role outside the realm of the humanities. Through 
empathic identification and engaging the literary imagination, one is able to integrate the 
experience of the other into one’s own reasoning and worldview, which impacts upon 
one’s functioning in the public domain. The experience of the individual, through the 
means of imaginative rendering, is communicated in a way that the personal becomes 
expanded into the realm of the social, and the personal narrative can take on a greater 
cultural significance and weight. It is through the reader’s capacity for empathy and 
identification that a distinct experience can become resonant in a larger manner. In an 
application to trauma narratives, I wish to describe how the sense of elegiac identification 
present in fictional trauma narratives written after and about the Shoah operates in 
shaping cultures of commemoration. 
 As the writers I have addressed are working in the shadow and legacy of the 
Shoah, their representations necessarily function in shaping how these instances of 
trauma and unjust death are grieved and commemorated. These representations of trauma 
carry with them the responsibility to the other’s suffering that has not been adequately 
witnessed. As such, the reader may bear witness to the suffering of the other through 
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some sense of elegiac identification with the other, reflecting upon the historical 
circumstances of the crisis or loss. In his work on literary representations of mourning, R. 
Clifton Spargo comments on the work of elegy in cultures of commemoration as related 
to obtaining a social good conscience. He writes that an “ordinary expression of grief 
might bring at least a provisional end to our historical responsibility by…restoring the 
proportion between our sympathy for others,” and “our historical sense of ourselves as 
beings who would demonstrate a better form of responsibility for others were they in our 
hands.”119 His focus upon historical responsibility continues, in writing that the reaction 
of,  
elegiac identification [functions] towards which we must be drawn if we 
are to come to any terms with the grief we feel over historical events…We 
must consider the facticity of unjust death that…might have been, at least 
in part, prevented. Such overtly historical connotations insist upon 
mourning’s misgivings as a form of conscience, even as they also 
emphasize that the expressions of grief are never adequate to the 
responsibilities they signify.120 
 
These instances of elegiac identification result in a sense of responsibility that is at least 
vaguely public because of the factual elements of historical connotations. This kind of 
responsibility results in difficult to resolve grief and does not allow for ethical correction 
or imaginative re-creations. However, in modes of literature and poetry, the same subject 
matter may be addressed, but there is more latitude in its treatment. Spargo writes,  
if poetry were required to imagine history as obedient to the sterner logic 
of mimetic representation—which is to say, as responsible for recording 
the world as it really was—there could be no gap between what happened 
and what might also have happened. And it is partly because of this gap 
between the sense of factual necessity presiding over our conception of a 
historical event and an imaginative understanding developed through a 	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hypothesis of subjective agency internal to the event that we can say it 
might have been possible for history to occur otherwise, thus creating 
space for critical dissent, imaginative revision, or ethical correction.121 
 
His contemplation of the logic of mimetic representations in relation to that of poetic 
representations functions to highlight the productive use of affect and proxy-witnessing. 
It is the very subjective internal agency of the poetically-rendered event that allows for 
the space for imaginative potentialities and creative re-visions. Spargo also addresses the 
importance of considering historical potentialities in the imaginative renderings of 
memory and trauma. The sense of responsibility for an experience or unjust death that is 
not adequately witnessed can be dealt with effectively, and channeled into productive 
avenues of remembrance and reclamation through imaginative means. Michaels also 
echoes this in writing that memory, “gains strength through restatement, reaffirmation; in 
a culture, through ritual, tradition, stories, art…when memory evokes considerations of 
what might have been or been prevented, memory becomes redemptive.”122 The feeling 
of responsibility for the other can be turned into a productive and redemptive undertaking 
in considering the potentialities and possible alterities of history. The potentialities of 
imaginative renderings in some way transcend our relationship to historical, empirical 
reality in allowing for an artful, constructed frame for the re-visioning of memory. In 
some aspects, the creative potentialities of memory allow for a productive remembering, 
claiming a certain impossible responsibility for the injustices carried out against the 
other, and ensuring that the injustice will not reoccur. The task of proxy-witnessing on 
behalf of the other functions on a level of cultural impact and memory through 
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commemoration in a chance to reclaim the condition of victimhood through the active 
creative choice in communicating one’s story. I am not arguing this is an exercise in 
inventing history, but rather as a way to give individual voice to an experience and 
avoiding descending into collectivist platitudes and generalizations of experience. It is 
through careful visions and re-visions of the injustices and crises of the past that we can 
look to the value of what I call “vigilant” memory. Vigilant memory combines the 
understanding of the ethos of an experience of trauma with a sense of responsibility and 
mode of commemoration. Through vigilant memory, we can re-anchor and give voice to 
the “geography of the eliminated”123 in a way that engages a cultural consciousness to the 
task of remembering, responsibility, revisioning, and hope. 
An aspect of the elegiac tones in writing after an experience of trauma is the 
reclamation of the experience in one’s own witnessing through a kind of repetition. 
Through empathy, there is a collapsing of time for the reenactment of experience, but 
also a further sense of identification that suggests a carrying forward of responsibility 
into a perpetual present. Susan Gubar writes that “what empathic reading…achieve[s] 
vis-à-vis trauma is a collapsing of time, the making out of every moment a second 
moment through parallel images that serve an ethical function in literature, as in 
liturgy.”124 This collapsing of time working in an ethical way is present in the inclusive 
terms of identification in Hebrew texts and religious practices. In Michaels’s Fugitive 
Pieces, Jakob refers to this tradition:     
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It’s Hebrew tradition that forefathers are referred to as “we,” not “they.” 
“When we were delivered from Egypt…” This encourages empathy and a 
responsibility to the past but, more important, it collapses time. The Jew is 
forever leaving Egypt. A good way to teach ethics. If moral choices are 
eternal, individual acts take on immense significance no matter how small: 
not for this life only.125   
 
In this way, the past is brought into a perpetual present, always reevaluated and revisited. 
There is a proxy-witnessing of the past, a collapsing of time, and an affirmation that the 
actions of the past are still relevant and ongoing. It is this act of inclusionary witnessing 
and remembering that lies at the basis of hope and reclamation. The Hebrew sense of 
commemoration involves a repetition that gives incredible weight to individual actions 
and morality. Through this emphasis, the past is brought into an eternal, inclusive present 
in which an individual is aware of their lived legacy, the scope of tradition, and what is 
expected of them. It is in this culture of commemoration that the past can be eternally 
revisited, remembered, and brought forward through responsibility.    
 It is this sense of responsibility, along with the imaginative capacities of writing 
that is ultimately of use in coming to terms and enacting a sense of regeneration after 
trauma, individual or otherwise. It is storytelling that is fundamental to these large tasks 
of cultural commemoration and personal regeneration. In areas in which language 
encounters limits of representation and expressibility, it is through creative means that 
those boundaries are pushed against and broken. The telling of experiences as powerful 
as trauma may fumble for expression, but the possibility of these stories remaining silent 
does not function most effectively in their redemption. Literature and memory effectively 
tell one’s stories, and can be creatively imagined in a way to service a larger, benevolent 
purpose. Literature and memory suspend our sense of “the real,” in order to draw 	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attention to the artifice of creation. There is an interest to maintain a sense of veracity, 
and not construct these experiences in a manner of wish-fulfillment—but in a way that 
enables an affirmation of human dignity and larger empathic identification. I believe it is 
even in the imaginative space of the most unspeakable extreme human experiences that 
we can find the empathy, understanding, identification, and respect that affirm our 
connectedness. Through vigilant memory, these extreme experiences are imaginatively 
rendered, re-anchored, and not forgotten—empathy allows for the lyrical present, a 
constant re-living. In this way we might can carry memory forward into a productive 
realm of re-affirmation, response, and responsibility.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
77	  
Bibliography 
_____________________________ 
 
 
Adorno, Theodor W. Negative Dialectics. Trans, E.B. Ashton. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1973. 
 
Adorno, Theodor. Prisms: Cultural Criticism and Society. Trans. Samuel and Sherry 
Weber. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981. 
 
Agamben, Giorgio. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen. London: Zone Books, 2002.  
 
Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. Trans Richard Howard. 
London: Flamingo/Harper Collins, 1984. 
 
Barthes, Roland. “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives,” Music, Image, 
Text, trans. Stephen Heath. New York: Fontana Press, 1977) 
 
Blackler, Deane. Reading W.G. Sebald: Adventure and Disobedience. Rochester, New 
York: Camden House, 2007. 
 
Caruth, Cathy. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
 
Cook, Méira. “At the Membrane of Language and Silence: Metaphor and Memory in 
Fugitive Pieces,” Canadian Literature 164(2000): 12-33. 
 
de Certeau, Michel; Luce Giard; and Pierre Mayol. The Practice of Everyday Life: 
Volume 2. Trans. Timothy J. Tomasik. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1998. 
 
Delbo, Charlotte. Tra s. Rosette Lamont. Days and Memories. Marlboro: The Marlboro 
Press, 1990. 
 
Denham, Scott and Mark McCulloh, ed. W.G. Sebald: history, memory, trauma. Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2006.  
 
Dubow, Jessica. “Case Interrupted: Benjamin, Sebald, and the Dialectical Image,” 
Critical Inquiry, 33.4(Summer 2007): 820-836. 
 
Felman, Shoshana and Dori Laub. Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis, and History. New York: Routledge, 1992. 
 
Felstiner, John. “Translating Celan’s Last Poem.” American Poetry Review (1982):20-45. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
78	  
Finch, Helen. “ ‘Die irdische Erfüllung’: Peter Handke’s Poetic Landscapes and W.G. 
Sebald’s Metaphysics of History.” in W.G. Sebald and the Writing of History, ed. Anne 
Fuchs and J.J. Long, 179-198. Würzburg: Verlag Königshausen & Neumann GmbH, 
2007. 
 
Gladwell, Malcolm. What the Dog Saw. New York: Penguin, 2009. 
 
Gubar, Susan. “Empathic Identification in Anne Michaels’s Fugitive Pieces: Masculinity 
and Poetry after Auschwitz,” Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society 
28.1(Autumn 2002), 249-276. 
 
Highmore, Ben. Everyday Life and Cultural Theory. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Highmore, Ben, ed. The Everyday Life Reader. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Kochhar-Lindgren, Gray. “Charcoal: The Phantom Traces of W.G. Sebald’s Novel-
Memoirs,” Monatshefte, 94.3(Fall 2002): 368-380. 
 
Long, J.J. and Anne Whitehead. W.G. Sebald: A Critical Companion. Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2004. 
 
Michaels, Anne. “Cleopatra’s Love.” Poetry Canada Review 14.2(March 1994): 14-15. 
 
Michaels, Anne. Fugitive Pieces. Great Britain: Bloomsbury, 2009. 
 
Michaels, Anne. Poems. New York: Alfred Knopf, 2010. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life. Boston:  
Beacon Press, 1995. 
 
Pence, Jeffrey. “Narrative Emotion: Feeling, Form and Function,” Journal of Narrative 
Theory, 34.3(Fall 2004): 273-276. 
 
Roberts, John. The Art of Interruption: realism, photography and the everyday. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998. 
 
Rostan, Kimberly. “Reading Traumatically and Representing the Real in Collective 
Suffering,” College Literature, 33.2(Spring 2006): 172-183.  
 
Schulz, Bruno. The Street of Crocodiles and Other Stories. New York: Penguin Books, 
1963. 
 
Schwartz, Lynne Sharon, ed.  The Emergence of Memory: Conversations with W.G. 
Sebald. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2007.  
 
Sebald, W.G. Austerlitz. London: Penguin Books, 2001. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
79	  
 
Sebald, W.G. On the Natural History of Destruction. London: Penguin Books, 2003.  
 
Spargo, R. Clifton. The Ethics of Mourning: Grief and Responsibility in Elegaic 
Literature. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. 
 
Stewart, Victoria. Women’s Autobiography: War and Trauma. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003.  	  
Whitehead, Anne. Memory. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
 
Williams, Arthur, Stuart Parks, Julian Preece, ed. “Whose Story?”—Continuties in 
Contemporary German-language Literature. New York: Peter Lang, 1998. 	  
Williams, Merle and Stefan Polantinsky. “Writing at its Limits: Trauma Theory in 
Relation to Anne Michaels’s Fugitive Pieces,” English Studies in Africa 52.1: 1-14. 
 
White, Hayden. “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,” Critical 
Inquiry 7(1980): 5-27. 	  
 
